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Abstract 
This study examined the main strategies adopted by the Angolan government in its post-
conflict reconstruction efforts, and the extent to which these efforts have promoted durable 
peace in the country. The number of post-conflict countries on the continent is increasing, 
with 16 African countries already in the process of implementing peace agreements signed 
during the last decade. With research showing that up to 50 percent of post-conflict countries 
relapse into violent conflict within five to 10 years of signing a peace agreement, 
implementing practical and effective strategies to prevent a return to conflict becomes 
imperative. In the light of the limited experience of African countries in post-conflict 
situations, Angola presented an interesting case study. The oil and diamond rich country, 
emerging in 2002 from over 40 years of conflict, has been able to develop its own home-
grown post-conflict reconstruction strategies. Notable progress in addressing some of its 
short-term post-conflict reconstruction priorities include, the successful resettlement of an 
estimated four million internally displaced persons (IDPs), and reintegrating more than half a 
million refugees and over 100 000 ex-combatants, into Angolan society. Progress in the 
areas of de-mining, as well as the rehabilitation of physical infrastructure, and increased 
enrolment in primary school education are other significant achievements. It is noteworthy 
that the Angolan government has, despite a lack of major international funding and overseas 
development assistance, been able to finance the majority of the expenses required for the 
country's reconstruction and re-Iaunching of the national economy. Importantly, the 
government's efforts have had some assistance in the form of oil-backed loans from China. 
Despite notable progress, such as the country's rapid economic growth, and being ranked 59th 
among the world's economies, Angola remains one of the most badly governed, corrupt, and 
unequal societies in the world. Credible improvements in the areas of good governance, 
socio-economic development, especially basic service delivery, and a more even distribution 
of the benefits of the country's oil wealth are vital in order to deliver significant peace 
dividends to the majority of the Angolan population. Making these improvements will be 
vital, and will influence considerably whether the country's post-conflict reconstruction 
efforts are ultimately successful. 
v 
ADRP 
APM 
APRM 
AU 
AUPEC 
BNA 
CAP 
CCA 
CED 
CNIDAH 
CNRSPDD 
CSP 
DDR 
DRC 
ECCAS 
OPEC 
ECP 
EIA 
EMRP 
EMS 
FAD 
FCD 
FLEC 
List of acronyms 
Angolan Demobilisation and Integration Programme 
Anti-personnel mine 
African Peer Review Mechanism 
African Union 
Aberdeen University Petroleum Economic Consultancy 
Central Bank of Angola 
Consolidated Appeal Process 
Common Country Assessment 
Executive Commission for Demining 
Intersectoral Commission for Demining and Humanitarian Assistance 
National Commission for Social and Productive Reintegration of the 
Demobilised and Displaced 
Country Strategy Paper 
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration 
Democratic Republic of Congo 
Economic Community of Central African States 
Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
Estrategia de Combate a Pobreza (Strategy to Combat Poverty) 
Environmental Impact Assessment 
Emergency Multi-sector Recovery Programme 
Environmental Management System 
Food and Agriculture Organisation 
Cabindan Forum for Dialogue 
Front for the Liberation of Cabinda Enclave 
VI 
FNLA 
GDDS 
GGC 
HDI 
HIV/AIDS 
HRCC 
IDA 
IDP 
IMF 
INAD 
INE 
LICUS 
MDG 
MICOPAX 
MINADER 
MINARS 
MPLA 
NEPAD 
OAU 
ODA 
OECD 
PEDR 
PIP 
PMFP 
National Front for the Liberation of Angola 
General Data Dissemination System 
Gulf of Guinea Commission 
Human Development Index 
Human Immunodeficiency Virusl Acquired Immune Deficiency 
Syndrome 
Human Rights Coordination Council 
Agricultural Development Institute 
Internally displaced persons 
International Monetary Fund 
National Demining Institute 
National Statistical Institute 
Low-Income Country Under Stress 
Millennium Development Goal 
Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in the Central Africa Republic 
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development 
Ministry of Assistance and Social Reinsertion 
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola 
New Partnership for Africa's Development 
Organisation of African Unity 
Overseas Development Assistance 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
Rural Extension and Rural Development Programme 
Public Investment Programme 
Public Finance Modernisation Programme 
VB 
PRESILD 
PRR 
PRS 
PRSP 
SADC 
SAPP 
SIGFE 
TB 
TSS 
UN 
UNAVEM 
UNCTAD 
UNDAF 
UNDP 
UNDP 
UNFPA 
UNHCR 
UNITA 
US 
USAID 
UXO 
Programme of Restructuring the Logistics and Distribution of Essential 
Products to the Population 
Post-conflict Rehabilitation and Reconstruction programme 
Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
Southern African Development Community 
Southern African Power Pool 
Sistema Integrado de Gestao Financeira do Estado (Integrated 
Financial Management Information System) 
Tuberculosis 
Transitional Support Strategy 
United Nations 
United Nations Angola Verification Mission 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
United Nations Development Assistance Framework 
United Nations Development Programme 
United Nations Development Programme 
United Nations Population Fund 
United Nations High Commission for Refugees 
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola 
U ni ted States 
United States Agency for International Development 
Unexploded Ordinance 
V111 
Table of contents 
Declaration ................................................................................................................................ ii 
Dedication ............................................................................................................................... iii 
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................. iv 
Abstract ..................................................................................................................................... v 
List of acronyms ...................................................................................................................... vi 
List of tables .......................................................................................................................... xiii 
List of boxes .......................................................................................................................... xiii 
Chapter 1. Introduction ........................................................................................................ 1 
1.1. Background and motivation ....................................................................................... 1 
1.2. Aim ............................................................................................................................ 7 
1.3. Methodology .............................................................................................................. 7 
1.4. Organisation of the study ........................................................................................... 8 
Chapter 2. Post-conflict reconstruction in the post-Cold War era ................................... 9 
2.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................ 9 
2.2. Post-conflict reconstruction in the post-Cold War era ............................................... 9 
2.3. Conceptual challenges ............................................................................................. 11 
2.4. Post-conflict reconstruction, development and statebui1ding .................................. 13 
2.5. Peace milestones ...................................................................................................... 16 
2.6. Special features of post-conflict countries ............................................................... 19 
2.7. Post-conflict reconstruction challenges ................................................................... 20 
2.8. Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 23 
Chapter 3. Angola: An overview ........................................................................................ 24 
3 .1. Introduction .............................................................................................................. 24 
IX 
3.2. The road to independence ........................................................................................ 24 
3.3. Angola's civil wars .................................................................................................. 26 
3.4. Peace processes ........................................................................................................ 27 
3.4.1 The Bicesse Accords ........................................................................................ 27 
3.4.2 Lusaka Protocol of 1994 .................................................................................. 28 
3.4.3 The Luena Peace Agreement ........................................................................... 29 
3.5. Cabinda .................................................................................................................... 29 
3.6. Legacy ofthe war: Angola today ............................................................................. 30 
3.7. Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 31 
Chapter 4. Angola's post-conflict development and reconstruction strategies ............. 33 
4.1. Introduction .............................................................................................................. 33 
4.2. Angola's post-conflict reconstruction strategies ...................................................... 33 
4.2.1 The International Donor Conference for Rehabilitation .................................. 33 
4.2.2 The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)/New Partnership for Africa's 
Development (NEPAD) Report ....................................................................................... 34 
4.2.3 The Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers .......................................................... 34 
4.2.4 Medium-term strategy ...................................................................................... 37 
4.2.5 Long-term plans ............................................................................................... 39 
4.3. Select strategies and development plans for key priority areas .............................. .40 
4.3.1 Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration ........................................... .40 
4.3.2 De-mining ........................................................................................................ 41 
4.3.3 Health ............................................................................................................... 41 
4.3.3.1 Reducing infant/child mortality .................................................................. .41 
4.3.3.2 HIV/AIDS .................................................................................................... 42 
4.3.3.3 Malaria/tuberculosis (TB) and other diseases ............................................. .42 
x 
4.3.4 Education ......................................................................................................... 43 
4.3.5 Financial management ..................................................................................... 43 
4.3.5.1 The Public Finance Modernisation Programme (PMFP) ............................ .43 
4.3.5.2 Statistical information .................................................................................. 44 
4.3.6 Governance ...................................................................................................... 44 
4.3.6.1 Decentralisation ........................................................................................... 44 
4.3.6.2 Public administration ................................................................................... 45 
4.3.6.3 Transparency ................................................................................................ 45 
4.3.7 Economy .......................................................................................................... 46 
4.3.7.1 Macro-economic stability ............................................................................ 46 
4.4. Role of external actors ............................................................................................. 47 
4.4.1 African Development Bank ............................................................................. 47 
4.4.2 European Commission ..................................................................................... 48 
4.4.3 The World Bank ............................................................................................... 48 
4.4.4 United Nations ................................................................................................. 49 
4.4.5 Bilateral donors ................................................................................................ 49 
4.5. Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 50 
Chapter 5. Rebuilding Angola ........................................................................................... 51 
5.1. 
5.2. 
5.2.1 
5.2.2 
5.2.3 
Introduction .............................................................................................................. 51 
Progress, challenges and prospects .......................................................................... 51 
Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR) ............................... 52 
De-mining ........................................................................................................ 54 
Infrastructure development .............................................................................. 55 
5.2.3.1 Transport ...................................................................................................... 55 
5.2.3.2 Construction sector ...................................................................................... 56 
Xl 
5.2.3.3 Power/energy sector ..................................................................................... 57 
5.2.4 Agriculture ....................................................................................................... 59 
5.2.5 Trading/SADC ................................................................................................. 60 
5.2.6 Economic management .................................................................................... 61 
5.2.7 Other initiatives ................................................................................................ 61 
5.3. Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 62 
Chapter 6. Findings and conclusion .................................................................................. 63 
6.1. Introduction .............................................................................................................. 63 
6.2. Findings .................................................................................................................... 63 
6.3. Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 66 
Bibliography ........................................................................................................................... 67 
xu 
List of tables 
Table 1 Peace milestone and indicators of progress 18 
Table 2 PRR priority phase - list of vital projects 36 
List of boxes 
Box 1 Peace milestones 17 
Box 2 Characteristics of post-conflict countries 20 
Box 3 Challenges for post-conflict countries 21 
X111 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1. Background and motivation 
Peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction l are very relevant to Africa, with 16 African 
countries already in the process of implementing peace agreements signed during the last 
decade. The number of post-conflict countries on the continent is also increasing2• With 
research showing that up to 50 percent of post-conflict countries relapse into violent conflict 
within five to ten years of signing a peace agreement,3 implementing practical and effective 
strategies to prevent a return to conflict becomes imperative.4 
In light of the limited experience of African countries in post-conflict situations, Angola 
presents an interesting and current case study. The country, emerging from more than 40 
years of armed conflict, has the potential to become a success story in post-conflict 
reconstruction. The Angolan government, faced with the immense and complex task of 
rebuilding a war ravaged country, has been firmly in control of efforts aimed at post-conflict 
recovery,5 and in only seven years has made some remarkable progress. The main 
1 Post-conflict reconstruction is understood as a complex system that provides for simultaneous short-, medium-and long 
term programmes to prevent disputes from escalating, avoid a relapse into violent conflict, and to build and consolidate 
sustainable peace. Post-conflict reconstruction systems proceed through three broad phases, namely the emergency phase, 
the transition phase and the development phase; however these should not be understood as absolute, fixed, time-bound or 
having clear boundaries. NEPAD African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework, 2005. Available at 
http://www.africanrevicw.org/docs/cont1ict/PCR%20Policy%20Framework.pdf. Accessed on 10 August 2008. Post-cont1ict 
reconstruction is also seen as 'a process that involves the achievement of a range of peace milestones'. Viewing post-
conflict countries as part of a 'transition continuum' would prevent placing countries in 'boxes' where they are either seen as 
'in conflict' or 'at peace'. Graham Brown, Arnim Langer and Frances Stewart, 2008. A Typology of Post-Conflict 
Environments: An Overview, CRISE Working Paper, No 53, London, p4. Available at 
http://www.crise.ox.ac.uk/pubs/workingpaper53.pdf; accessed on 21 February 2010. 
2 Peace Agreements in Africa. Available at htlp:!lwww.accord.org.zalour-worklknowledge-production!peace-
agreements.htm!. Accessed on 10 August 2008. 
3 McAskie, C. 2007. The International Peacebuilding Challenge: Can new players and new approaches bring new results. 
The Lloyd Shaw lecture in Public Affairs, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, 22 November 2007, p4. Available at 
http://www. un.org!peace/peacebui Iding/Staterncntsl ASG%20Carolyn%20M cAskie/Sha w%)20final.pdf. Accessed on 2 
November 2009. See also Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding in Africa, Conflict Trends, Volume 3, ACCORD, 2009, p2. 
http://www.accord.org.zaldownloads/ctict 2009 3.pdt~ Accessed on 10 February 2010. 
4 Some of the conditions which place war-tom countries at continuing risk of relapsing into violent conflict include: 
weakened state capacity, destroyed physical, human and social capital, distorted economic incentives, widespread poverty 
and massive unemployment. Some countries also have to cope with criminal networks that plunder their resources, and 
former warlords who resist relinquishing power. United Nations Development Programme, 2008. Post-cont1ict Economic 
Recovery: Enabling Local Ingenuity, piv. Available at http://contenLundp.org/go/newsroom/2008/october/new-report-
provides-insights-on-post-contlict-economic-rccovery.en. Accessed on 10 February 20 I O. 
5 The war destroyed important physical infrastructure, impacted on the macro-economy of the country, and resulted in 
increased poverty among the majority of the population. Angola: Post-Conflict Challenges, Country Assessment Report, 
1 
achievement for the Angolan people must be the sustained peace experienced smce the 
country's 27-year civil war ended with the signing of the Luena Peace Agreement in April 
2002.6 The absence of violent conflict, a visible peace dividend, is a welcome change for the 
people of Angola, half of whom had never lived without conflict. 7 
During the first three-and-a-half years of peace, the Angolan government's strategic priorities 
included: i) the social and productive reintegration of demobilised soldiers and populations 
displaced during the war; ii) improved delivery of basic social services to people throughout 
the country; and iii) macro-economic stabilisation. The country also began the monumental 
task of rebuilding its infrastructure, and promoting social and economic development. In 
September 2008, Angola's first multi-party elections in 16 years were held.8 Some initial key 
objectives and significant peace milestones have been reached, including the resettlement of 
an estimated four million internally displaced persons (IDPs), as well as the reintegration into 
Angolan society of almost half a million refugees and about 100 000 ex-combatants. 
Progress is also being made in the areas of de-mining9 and the reconstruction and 
rehabilitation of infrastructure. Other notable achievements are in the areas of education and 
health. 1O Most celebrated has been the country's incredibly rapid economic growth, which 
has made it Africa's fastest growing economy and largest oil producer in 2008. The country's 
macro-economic stability and improved performance in the non-mineral, transport and 
agricultural sectors are reflected by the high annual growth rates and the lowering of inflation 
UNHCRIAUINEPAD Sub Cluster on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development, March 2008, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 
p25 - 30. 
6 A distinguishing feature of the Luena peace agreement is that it resulted from a military victory by one of the warring 
parties over the other. This factor is significant, because together with a battle weary population it makes a return to civil 
war highly unlikely. Angola: Post-Conflict Challenges, Country Assessment Report, March 2008, p25 - 30. 
7 Children under 15 years comprise over half of Angola's population of 13 million, and 20 percent are under the age of five. 
Jenny Clover, Angola's Children: Bearing the Greatest Cost of War, African Security Review, Vol. 11 (3). Available at 
http://www.iss.co.zaiPubs!ASRII1N03!Clover.html. Only two percent of the population is 65 years or older. Angolan 
Government Ministry of Planning, Strategy to Combat Poverty: Social Reinsertion, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction and 
Economic Stabilisation. Available at http://www.angolaemb.se/Actualidades/Combate%20a%20pobreza.pd±: Accessed on 
10 November 2009. 
8 Presidential elections are set to take place in 2012. EDC Economics: Angola, Available at 
http://www.edc.caienglish/docs/gangola s c.pd±: Accessed on 2 November 2009. 
9 United Nations Development Programme. Angola: Millennium Development Goals Report Summary 2005. An estimated 
seven million mines needs clearing. At least 80 000 people are reported to have lost limbs as a result of landmines during 
the conflict. Demining is also critical to food stability as 85 percent of the population engages in subsistence agriculture. 
Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2009: Angola, 16 July 2009, Available at 
.http://www.unhrc.orgjrefworld/docidl4a6452d514.html. Accessed on I November, 2009. 
10 In 2003, one million children returned to school and more than 29 000 teachers were recruited. Also in 2003, about 5.2 
million children were vaccinated against polio, although new cases of the illness have since been reported. United Nations. 
Angola: Mid-term Review of the Brussels Program of Action - Least Developed Countries, Final Progress Report 2005. 
Available at http://www.un.org/special-rep/ohrlls/ldc/MTRI Angola.pdf Accessed on 2 February 2010. 
2 
recorded since 2000. These changes are seen to provide further opportunities for the 
government to make far-reaching reforms aimed at sustainable socio-economic development. 
The Angolan government has since 2002 financed the majority of the expenses required for 
the country's reconstruction and re-launching of the national economy. The country's appeal 
in 2002 for an International Donor Conference for Rehabilitation, after it had already 
prepared a Post-Conflict Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Programme intended as the basis 
for discussion at the conference, went unheeded. To date a conference of this nature has not 
materialised. In 2003, Angola's Minister of External Relations, Dr Joao Bernardo de 
Miranda, highlighted to the 58th Session of the United Nations General Assembly the lack of 
assistance from the international community, contrasting its inaction with the swift response 
being provided to other African countries in post-conflict situations. I I However, in their 
defence, donors have pointed out the weakness and inadequate transparency of Government 
systems for budget management, procurement, accounting and auditing as reasons for their 
reluctance to provide financial assistance directly to the Government. 12 
Despite the lack of major international funding and limited Overseas Development 
Assistance (ODA) for its reconstruction programmes, Angola has with the assistance of oil-
backed loans from China, amounting to a staggering US$13.4 billion in 2009, been able to 
meet a number of the country's reconstruction priorities. 13 The ties between China and 
Angola have since been strengthened by a number of developments. In 2006, Angola became 
China's largest trading partner in Africa, with trade between the two countries reaching 
US$12 billion. While in 2007, China overtook the United States as the largest importer of 
II Angola: Statement by H.E. loao Bernardo de Miranda, Minister for External Relations ofthe Republic of Angola, at the 
General Debate ofthe 58th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 26 September, 2003. Available at 
http://www.un.org!webcastiga/58/statements/angoeng030926.htm. Accessed on 8 March, 2010. During his statement, 
Minister de Miranda renewed the April 2002 appeal for an International Donor Conference for Rehabilitation. See also 
United Nations Development Programme, 2005. Economic Report on Angola 2002-2004: Defusing the Remnants of War, 
pI. Available at http://mirror.undp.org/angolaiLinkRtf/ang ecorep.2005.pdt: accessed on 8 March 2010; and United 
Nations, Angola: Mid-term Review of the Brussels Program of Action - Least Developed Countries, Final Progress Report 
2005, available at http://www.un.org/special-rep!ohrlls/ldc/MTR! Angola.pdt: accessed on 21 February 20 I O. 
12 Angola: The Post-War Challenges, Country Assessment Report, United Nations System in Angola, Common Country 
Assessment 2002, p89. Available at http://mirror.undp.org/angolaiLinkRttlCCA2002.pdf. Accessed on 4 February 2010. 
13 Vines, A., Wong, L., Weimer, M., Campos, I. 2009. Thirst for African Oil: Asian National Oil Companies in Nigeria and 
Angola. Chatham House, London, p3, available at http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/tilesIl4524 r0809 afiicanoil.pdL 
Accessed on 6 February 2010. 
3 
Angolan oil14 and is currently Angola's largest investor. Especially in the area of 
infrastructure development, China has been involved in both the construction and financing 
of over 100 projects in the areas of water, energy, health, education, telecommunications, 
fisheries and public works. IS 
Despite some important achievements, and ranking 59th among the world's economies III 
terms of gross domestic product, 16 Angola remains one of the world's most unequal societies. 
The country's weak social indicators include a Human Development Index (HDI) of 0.381, 
ranking it 166th (out of 177), and amongst the lowest worldwide. 17 Two-thirds of the 
population continue to live below the poverty line. 18 Angola has the world's second highest 
under-five mortality rate. Malaria, a preventable disease, is the major cause of death in the 
country for both children and adults. 19 The Angolan government does however, outline in its 
medium-term development plan its priorities for Human Development, including its intention 
to improve the HDI ranking by 30 places in order to position itself amongst the medium 
development countries by 2025.20 
An explicit emphasis on poverty reduction is however not included III the country's 
development vision. Instead, the government intends to improve overall living conditions, 
indirectly - through economic growth and overall modernisation of the country, rather than 
14 Vines, A., Wong, L., Weimer, M., Campos, I. 2009, p42. 
15 Campos, I, Vines, A. 2008. Angola and China: A Pragmatic Partnership. Working Paper Presented at a CSIS Conference, 
Prospects for Improving US-China-Africa Cooperation, December 5,2007, Chatham House, London, pI. Available at 
http://csis.orglfiles/media!csis!pubs/080603 campos angolachina.pdf. Accessed on 6 February 2010. 
16 United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), Angola: 2009 - 2013, p9. Available at 
http://mirror.undp.org/angola/LinkRttiUNDAF-AO-2009 2013-En.pdf Accessed on 8 February 2010. 
17 African Development Bank, 2005. Angola: Results-Based Country Strategy Paper (RBCSP) 2005-2007, pvi. Available at 
http://www. afdb. org/fi I eadmin/up loads! afdblDocuments/Project -and-Operations/AD B-B D-WP -2005-73-EN -AN GO LA-
RBCSP-2005-2007-FINAL.PDF. Accessed on 8 February 2010. 
IS Over two thirds of the Angolan population remains poor (living on less than $1 per day), with one in four Angolans being 
extremely poor (living on less than $0.75 per day). Aid Harmonisation and Alignment for Greater Development 
Effectiveness. Available at http://www.aidharrnonization.org. Accessed on 31 October 2009. 
19 Angola: The Post-War Challenges, Common Country Assessment, 2002, p91. 
20 The government's Human Development Goals are: improving the living conditions of Angolans, eradicating hunger and 
poverty and promoting adequate levels of education and basic sanitation; promoting national cohesion and the consolidation 
of democracy; and ensuring sustainable economic development, freedom and fundamental rights. United Nations 
Development Assistance Framework in Angola (UNDAF), April 2009, p6-7. Despite the high prevalence of poverty, Angola 
as a country does not belong to the poor in terms of GDP per capita. The World Bank classifies it as a lower middle income 
country, and it may soon be among the middle income countries in terms of average GDP per capita. Isaksen, J., Tvedten, J., 
Ilinga, P. 2006. Experience and Institutional Capacity for Poverty and Income Distribution Analysis in Angola, Chr 
Michelsen Institute, p3. Available at http://www.cmi.no/publications!filei2540-experience-and-institutional-capacity-for-
poverty. pdt: Accessed on 8 February 2010. 
4 
directly with poverty reduction as a primary focus. 21 Analysts have pointed out that the 
government's strategy has been shaped by the idea of gradualism: investing first in 
infrastructure that is visible and has tangible results, leaving human development to the 
second phase of its post-conflict recovery.22 
Angola has the potential to playa significant role in the regIOn and continent.23 The 
country's participation in the Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in the Central Africa 
Republic (MICOP AX), under the authority of the Economic Community of Central African 
States (ECCAS)24, is seen as especially relevant to advancing peace and security in 
neighbouring countries. The country's armed forces are battle-trained and considered as one 
of the most experienced on the continent.25 The country also intervened in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo and Congo-Brazzaville conflicts. 
A desire to change its international image and gain global respectability, has led to strategic 
engagement with key organisations continentally and globally. In 2007 Angola became a 
member of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), taking over the 
chairmanship of the organisation in January 2009. This has largely been viewed both as a 
positive step towards economic security and as a means to further its international influence 
in the oil industry. Significantly, Angola was the first country to be admitted to the 
21 Shaxson, N., Neves, 1., Pacheco, F. 2008. Drivers of Change: Angola- Summary of Findings, Department of 
International Development (Dfid), United Kingdom. Available at 
ukinangola.tco.gov.uklrcsources/cn/word/3647797/english-summary. Accessed on 8 February 2010. Rehabilitating 
electrical and hydro-electrical infrastructure expanded electricity access to thousands of people; similarly, the rehabilitation 
of water supply systems has granted thousands more people access to clean water. The rehabilitation of roads, bridges and 
rail networks will facilitate commercial activities; while rehabilitation of hospitals, health centres, schools and universities 
will provide access to education and health to communities. Campos, I, and Vines, A., 2008, p 18-19; Some of the 
government's plans for the medium-term include building one million new houses in the country by 2012, and creating 1.3 
million jobs during this parliament. Reuters, Angola to Launch Fund to Build One Million Homes for the Poor, IS April 
2009. Available at http://af.reuters.com/article/topNewslidAFJOES3 EOFR2009041S. Accessed on 10 February 2010. 
22 Magalhaes Ferreria, P. 2009. State-Society Relations in Angola: Peacebuilding, democracy and political participation, 
Initiative for Peacebuilding, Madrid, p31. Available at http://www.fride.org. Accessed on February 12, 2010. 
23 Angola's growing economy has led to its being tipped, remarkably, only three years since the end of the war, as South 
Africa's biggest rival within the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region. Adebajo, A. Regional rival 
Angola could yet become SA's best friend, Business Day, 19 August 2009. In 2008 Angola overtook Nigeria as the leading 
sub-Saharan oil producer. It has also become a major oil supplier to South Africa, while South Africa has become a major 
trading partner, with a number of entrepreneurs and major companies seeking to penetrate the Angolan market. Magalhaes 
Ferreria, P.2009,pI6. 
24 Magalhaes Ferreria, P. 2009, p30. 
25 By 200 I, the Government of Angola had been involved in armed conflicts in all neighbouring states with the exception of 
Zambia. United Nations Development Programme, 200S. Economic Report on Angola in 2002-2004: Defusing the 
Remnants of War, pI. Available at http://min·or.undp.org/angola/LinkRtf/ang ewrep.200S.pdf Accessed on 8 February 
2010. 
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organisation since 1975. Angola's non-pennanent two-year seat on the UN Security Council 
in 2003 also raised the country's profile on the world scene. Its role in the Gulf of Guinea 
Commission (GGC), fonnally launched in August 2006, could serve to extend the country's 
influence in the area. Angola is also closely involved in the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) initiatives, taking over the presidency of the SADC Organ on Politics, 
Defence and Security in 2007. The country is expected to playa key role in SADC's regional 
development plan, specifically in the area of deployment of road links and interconnections in 
the energy sector.26 In August 2007, Francisco Pereira Furtado, Angola's Chief of Staff ofthe 
Anned Forces, indicated that Angola's role in the African Standby Force will be 
considerable, with its soldiers constituting 30 percent of the force - possibly more than South 
Africa will provide.27 Angola also actively participates in African Union (AU) activities. In 
July 2004, Angola signed on to the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), and in 2007 it 
was elected a member of the AU Peace and Security Counci1.28 The country has also signed 
the UN Convention Against Corruption in 2003. In 2007 it was elected for a three-year 
mandate at the UN Human Rights Counci1.29 
For now, Angola remains listed in international ratings such as Transparency International's 
Corruption Perception Index, and will have to increase its efforts at good governance in order 
to change this perception. In this regard, the government has shown a willingness to increase 
transparency relating to its oil revenues,30 and has accepted a package from the World Bank 
that provides technical assistance to improve transparency and reduce off-sheet-budget 
expenditure.31 
26 Although Angola is a member of both the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP) and Energy Pool of Central Africa 
(PEAC), it currently does not have any interconnections with its neighbours, apart from isolated lines serving several towns 
on the country's southern border with Namibia. International Energy Agency, 2006. Angola: Towards an Energy Strategy, 
p19. Available at http://www.ica.org/publications!free new Dcsc.asp?PUBS 10=1818. Accessed on 8 February 2010. 
27 Shaxson, N., Neves, J., Pacheco, F. 2008. Drivers of Change: Angola - Summary of Findings, pI O. 
28 Participating countries in the APRM benchmark good governance with shared African and international norms and 
standards, through a process that is inclusive and involves a variety of stakeholders. United Nations Development 
Programme, 2005. Economic Report on Angola in 2002-2004: Defusing the Remnants of War, p3. See also Magalhaes 
Ferreria, P., 2009, p8. 
29 Magalhaes Ferreria, P., 2009, p19. 
30 International Energy Agency, 2006, p 16. The government has also published a critical investigation of its oil revenues 
~erformed by consulting firm KPMG, identifying most oil revenue flows. 
I The Angolan government also organised an international petroleum revenue management conference in May 2006, and 
has published a report on the future of the oil sector' Petroleum Outlook'. It has also started applying the principles of the 
EITT to its own industry. Magalhaes Ferreria, P., 2009, p19. 
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Angola's post-conflict reconstruction programmes will only be successful if they are 
implemented in ways that will benefit the majority of the population, and especially if the 
benefits from its growing economy are distributed more evenly throughout Angolan society. 
This achievement will certainly gain the international and regional respectability the Angolan 
government is aspiring to. 
1.2. Aim 
This study seeks to address two key questions: i) what has been the main strategies adopted 
by the Angolan government in its post-conflict reconstruction efforts?; and, ii) to what extent 
does this bode well for promoting durable peace in the country? To answer the questions, the 
research aims to critically assess the post-conflict reconstruction strategies of the Angolan 
government, where the 27 -year civil war ended in 2002. The merits and flaws of these 
strategies, how they are being implemented, the difficulties and challenges which accompany 
them, and whether to date there have been successes, will be assessed. 
Specifically, programmes for socio-economic development; good governance; reform of 
justice and security institutions; efforts at demobilisation, disarmament and the reintegration 
of ex-combatants into society; refugee repatriation; economic recovery, and particularly the 
rebuilding of financial systems, will serve as some of the key areas that will form the basis 
for this assessment of Angola's progress towards successful, post-conflict reconstruction. 
1.3. Methodology 
The research was a literature-based review. 
Data were collected by reviewing secondary sources such as books, journals, and papers 
presented at conferences, UN Secretaries-General reports, as well as reports of UN agencies 
such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA); the World Bank; the African 
7 
Development Bank; and official government documents such as the Angolan Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers. 
Internet-based research was conducted, especially using the web sites of the United Nations, 
European Union, African Union, NEP AD and major donor organisations. 
1.4. Organisation of the study 
Chapter One provides a background and motivation for the study. 
Chapter Two presents an overview of post-conflict reconstruction in the post-Cold War era. 
Chapter Three provides an overview of Angola, focusing briefly on its history, civil wars, 
peace processes, and current political, social, and economic climate. 
Chapter Four details the short-, medium-, and long-term development and reconstruction 
programmes of the Angolan government. 
Chapter Five focuses on the implementation of some of the key priority areas of the 
reconstruction programmes and assesses their progress, challenges and prospects. 
Chapter Six provides the conclusion and findings of the research. 
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Chapter 2. Post-conflict reconstruction in the post-Cold 
War era 
2.1. Introduction 
Angola is one of a growing number of post-conflict countries in Africa. In 2007 there were 
only three active conflicts, compared to the 19 conflicts the region witnessed between 1990 
and 2000.32 African countries that have signed, and are implementing peace agreements 
include, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Burundi, Rwanda, Chad33 , Cote d'Ivoire, 
Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea/Ethiopia, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mozambique, Niger34, Senegal, 
and Sierra Leone. 
Approaches to post-conflict reconstruction and recovery processes in Africa are heavily 
influenced by external actors and overall global political, security and economic concerns. 
This chapter considers post-conflict reconstruction in the post-Cold War era and its 
implications for Africa's rising number of post-conflict countries. 
2.2. Post-conflict reconstruction in the post-Cold War era 
Post-conflict stabilisation became a new area of focus for the United Nations (UN) following 
a sharp increase in intra-state35 conflicts in the period immediately after the end of the Cold 
War. It became apparent that despite the variety of intervention strategies36 that could be 
used as critical tools for dealing with violent conflict, the UN lacked a coherent approach for 
32 Chad, Sudan and Somalia are currently the only states engaged in active civil wars. Nkurunziza, 1. 2008. Civil War and 
Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Africa. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Geneva: Switzerland, p3. 
Available at http://www.afdb.org/tilcadmin/uploadsiafdblDocumcnts/Knowlcdge. Accessed on 10 August 2008. See also 
Gambari, I. 2006. The UN, NEPAD and the Commission for Africa in Adebajo, A. Scanlon, H. (eds.) A Dialogue of the 
Deaf Essays on Africa and the United Nations. Jacana Media: Auckland Park. 
33 The latest peace agreement was signed in August 2007. Overview of key peace agreements in Africa: 1990 - 2007. 
Available at http://www.accord.org.zaldownloads.!peaceagreemcnts/P A overview. pdf. Accessed on 10 August 2008. 
34 A peace agreement was signed in 1995, however hostilities continue intermittently between the government and other 
rebel movements. Overview of key peace agreements in Africa: 1990 - 2007, p3. 
35 About 13 out of 15 UN peacekeeping operations over the last decade dealt with intra-state contlict. 
36 The UN used a variety of intervention strategies, including preventative diplomacy, peacekeeping, peacemaking, and 
peacebuilding that became critical tools for dealing with violent contlicts. McAskie, C., 2007, p2 
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dealing with countries in a post-conflict setting and that a new framework to manage intra-
state armed conflicts was needed. 37 
Unlike traditional methods for dealing with inter-state conflicts, the new types of intra-state 
conflicts required a simultaneous mix of military and civilian intervention which led to the 
expansion of the mandate of peacekeeping missions to include an array of activities which 
fall under the banner of peacebuilding.38 Former Assistant Secretary General for 
Peacebuilding Support, Carolyn McAskie, has noted that at the time of conception there was 
not yet recognition that peacebuilding as a concept may bring together peacemaking, 
peacekeeping and post-conflict development.39 She also highlighted that until peacebuilding 
appeared as an official concept, UN actions were based on a sequential approach toward the 
transition from war to peace which had characterised inter-state conflicts. The concept has 
evolved significantly since then, with statebuilding emerging as the central objective of 
b 'ld' 40 peace U1 mg. 
Senior UN officials such as Lakhdar Brahimi, Former Special Adviser of the Secretary 
General of the United Nations, view the establishment of the 2005 UN Peacebuilding 
Commission, as an important step towards "integrating statebuilding as a central aim of UN 
interventions in post-conflict situations",41 further highlighting the central place of 
statebuilding in UN approaches to peacebuilding. With its overall aim to help the UN to 
37 McAskie, C., 2007. The International Peacebuilding Challenge: Can new players and new approaches bring new results. 
The Lloyd Shaw lecture in Public Affairs, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, 22 November 2007, p2. Available at 
bttp://www.un.org!pcacc!pcacebuil ding/Statcmcnts! ASG%20Caro Iyn %20 M cAskiciShaw'%20fiIHlI. pdt: Accessed on 10 
August 2009. 
38 The United Nations Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia (1989-1990) was the first such type operation, 
with a mandate including elections, policing and demilitarization. Other complex peacebuilding operations include Angola 
(UNAVEM - 1991-1995). Included in their mandates were human rights and elections monitoring; the demobilisation and 
reintegration offormer combatants into civilian life, and the promotion of economic liberalization. McAskie, C., 2007. 
39 McAskie, c., 2007. 
40 Paris, R., Sisk, T.D. 2007. Managing Contradictions: The Inherent Dilemmas of Post-war Statebuilding, International 
Peace Academy, New York, p3. Available at http://www.rcliefweb.int/rwllib.nslJdb900SID/ JBRN-7PECP5?OpenDocument. 
Accessed on 22 February 2010. 
41 Brahimi, L. 2007. State Building in Crisis and Post-Contlict Countries, Paper presented at the 7th Global Forum on 
Reinventing Government Building Trust in Government, 26 - 29 June 2007, Vienna, Austria. p 18, Available at 
http://unpan l.un.orgiintradoc/groups/publicidocuments/UN/UNP AN026305.pdt: Accessed on 22 February 20 I O. According 
to Brahimi, the PBC has been conceived as a mechanism through which resources will be brought together, support 
sustained and coordination established for peacebuilding operations. He also suggests that the PBC should; i) advocate for a 
more coherent statebuilding approach that avoids the artificial distinctions often made between peacekeeping, recovery and 
development activities; ii) ensure sustained attention to statebuilding even after the immediate post-conflict period is over; 
iii) encourage integration among the UN entities involved in post-conflict contexts; identify gaps in capacity and financing 
for UN missions; and iv)institutionalise and integrate knowledge and lessons learned in these contexts. 
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effectively assist countries in their transition from war to peace, the Peacebuilding 
Commission was an important step in addressing an institutional gap in the UN. The 
Commission is especially significant to Africa, with all four countries currently on its agenda 
b · Afri 42 emg can. 
Scholars have also suggested that concerns about failed and fragile states have led to the 
increased prominence of statebuilding in academic and policy debates, evident in recent 
publications by the UN and other multilateral organisations such as the European Union, and 
the OECD. Statements by powerful states such as the United States and Britain also reflect 
the same concern. With African states frequently described as "weak", "fragile" or "failing", 
it is important that the idea of statebuilding as a central aim of peacebuilding should be 
further investigated.43 
2.3. Conceptual challenges 
There are several VIews on post-conflict reconstruction. One VIew IS that post-conflict 
reconstruction has become the politically correct or politically 'sensitive' way of referring to 
statebuilding.44 Others see post-conflict reconstruction as a 'huge experiment', and as 
'unchartered territory' .45 The UN's Lakhdar Brahimi, summed up a predominant view when 
he stated in 2007, "the business of helping countries make peace and rebuild after conflict is 
not an exact science".46 
42 Burundi, Sierra Leone, Central African Republic and Guinea Bissau, are currently on the Commission's agenda. United 
Nations Peacebuilding Commission. Available at http://www.un.org!peace!peacebuilding!qanda.shtml. Accessed on 
21 February 2010. 
43 OECD. 2008. Concepts and Dilemmas of Statebuilding in Fragile Situations: From Fragility to Resilience, p7. Available at 
http://www.occd.orgidataoccd/59/51/41100930.pdf. Accessed on 21 February 20 I O. See also Van de Walle, S., Scott, Z. 
2009. The Role of Public Services in State-and Nation-building: Exploring Lessons from European History for Fragile 
states, Governance and Social Development Resource Centre (GSDRC) Research Paper, International Development 
Department, University of Binningham, p3. Available at http://www.publicservices.ac.uk/wp-
contentluploads/vdewalle 2009-research-paper.pdt: Accessed on 21 February 2010. 
44 Rubin, B. 2005. Constructing Sovereignty for Security, Survival, Vol. 47. No 4. Winter 2005 p93-1 06. See also Hamre, 
1.1., Sullivan, G.R. Toward Post Conflict Reconstruction, in The Washington Quarterly, 2002. Vol. 25. No 4. p85 -96. 
Available at http://www.twg.com/02autumn/hamrc.pdf Accessed on 21 February 2010. 
45 Paris, R., Sisk, T.D. 2007, pI. 
46 Brahimi, L. 2007, p4. 
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In much of the recent literature, the concepts peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction 
are often used interchangeably, reflecting the lack of a clear definition for either concept. It 
is also clear from research available that both concepts are still evolving.47 
The most well-known and widely used definition of peacebuilding was developed by former 
UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. In his landmark report, the 1992 Agenda for 
Peace, peacebuilding is defined as "action to identify and support structures which will tend 
to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict".48 
A conceptual weakness of this definition is the emphasis placed on "preventing large scale 
violence or the recurrence of violence immediately after wars or armed conflicts" which 
some scholars argue it reveals a strong focus on 'negative peace' as well as excludes the 
possibility of preventative measures.49 There are other scholars, however, who have pointed 
out that since 1992, the UN's peace instruments- prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding, are no longer viewed as chronological steps on the conflict management 
continuum, but are rather seen as interlinked, and interdependent aspects of the same 
process.50 
Peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction are ongoing activities. However, there exists 
no template for post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding.51 This is seen as a critical 
shortcoming in international peacebuilding systems. Of the few examples available of 
strategic frameworks for peacebuilding being applied are processes such as the UN 
Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), and the Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) 
developed by the humanitarian community. The CAP process, however, is seen as being 
more a resource mobilisation tool than a strategic planning tool. 52 There are also researchers 
who regard the World Bank's Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS), aimed at aligning the 
47 de Coning, C. 2010. Clarity, Coherence and Context: Three Priorities for Sustainable Peacebuilding, Norwegian Institute 
of International Affairs. Available at http://www.socialsciences.uottawa.ca/ccpi-cips/eng!documents/deConing.pdf. 
Accessed on 8 March 20 I O. 
48 Boutros-Ghali, B. 1992. An Agenda for Peace: Preventative Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping, New York, 
pi!. Available at http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html. Accessed on 8 March 2010; 
49 de Coning, C. 201O.p12 
50 Ibid. 
51 Paris R., Sisk, T.D. 2007, pI. 
52 de Coning, C. 2008. The Coherence Dilemma in Peacebuilding and Post-Conflict Reconstruction Systems, in African 
Journal in Conflict Resolution, Vol (8) Nr 3. Durban, p98. 
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overall development strategy of the external actors and the host Government, as one of the 
most broad and pervasive processes yet developed. However, some of the weaknesses in the 
PRS process have been highlighted, and include its emphasis on macro-economic and 
financial issues. The PRS has also not been designed to manage post-conflict transitions in 
fragile states. 53 
The creation of the 2005 UN Peacebuilding Commission as a strategy for managmg 
peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction has already been mentioned above. At a 
regional level, the 2005 African Union Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework seeks 
to contribute to efforts at preventing, managing and resolving conflicts in Africa, by amongst 
others "addressing one of the remaining gaps in the African peace and security architecture, 
namely the nexus between the peace, security, humanitarian and development dimensions of 
post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding,,54. The African Union Peace and Security 
Council protocol of 2002 also makes provision for the Council "to promote peace, security 
and stability in Africa; to anticipate and prevent conflicts; promote and implement peace-
building and post conflict reconstruction activities and promote and encourage democratic 
practises". 55 These are important efforts, and the current global and regional strategies and 
programmes being applied will need time to be refined through practise before they can be 
meaningfully analysed. 56 
2.4. Post-conflict reconstruction, development and statebuilding 
Lakhdar Brahimi, former Special Adviser of the Secretary General of the United Nations 
stated in 2007 that, "statebuilding is unapologetically seen as the central objective of any 
peace operation".57 Some of the key activities which should be undertaken in pursuit of this 
objective would include constitution-making, electoral processes, reintegration and national 
53 de Coning, C. 2008, p99. 
54 NEP AD - African Post-Contlict Reconstruction Framework, 2005. Available at 
http://www.africanreview.org/docs/contlict/PCR%20Policy%20Framework.pdf. 
55 Murithi, T. 2006. Towards a symbiotic partnership: The UN Peacebuilding Commission and the Evolving AUINEP AD 
Post-Contlict Reconstruction Framework in Adebajo, A., Scanlon, H. (eds.) Dialogue of the Deaf Essays on Africa and the 
United Nations. Jacana Media: Auckland Park. 
56 De Coning, C. 2008, plOO. 
57 Brahimi, L. 2007, p4. See also Paris, R., Sisk, T.D. 2007,pl. 
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reconciliation, and implementing the rule of law. He further states that "despite a mandate 
for global security and many years experience of working on post-conflict reconstruction, the 
UN is still struggling to develop the necessary concepts and capacities to assist statebuilding 
in a coherent and effective manner. 58 Brahimi advocates a "light footprint approach,,59 to 
post-conflict reconstruction. 
The view that statebuilding has become a central focus of multidimensional peace operations 
in war-tom societies is echoed by several scholars, including Paris and Sisk, who further 
argue that "statebuilding - the construction of legitimate, effective governmental institutions 
- is a crucial element in any larger effort to create the conditions for a durable peace and 
human development in countries that are just emerging from war. Without functioning and 
legitimate state institutions, post-conflict societies are less likely to escape the dual traps of 
violence and poverty".60 
The complementarity between statebuilding and peacebuilding has also been highlighted. 
Peacebuilding and statebuilding are seen to address overlapping problems. Both processes 
are geared towards moving societies towards situations which would be conducive to 
development. Both processes are seen as necessary because weak and fragile states lack key 
attributes that benefit citizens. In addition, it is argued that both peacebuilding and 
statebuilding require attention to both sides of the state-society relationship, which it states 
cannot work if either side is prioritised at the expense of the other. States should have the 
58 Brahimi, L. 2007.p4; Several organs/departments of the UN also espouse this view as seen in a 2007 UNDESA discussion 
paper which states that "State- or nation-building is the central objective of every peacebuilding operation and is dependent 
upon the reconstitution of sustainable governance structures." The paper further states that post-conflict nation building 
comprises, at minimum: the rule of law, judicial, constitutional and security sector reform, the establishment of mechanisms 
of political participation and inclusive policies, the effective provision of basic services and good, fighting corruption, 
fostering a democratic culture, free and transparent elections, and the promotion oflocal governance. UNDESA,2007. 
Governance Strategies for Post-Conflict Reconstruction, Sustainable Peace and Development, p9. Available at 
http://www.urman.org!Regions/Global/Librarv/tabid/1 031M odu leI D/Sl3lmctllDocumentDetai lsi didl2 83 32/language! en-
US!Detuult.aspx. Accessed on 10 August 2009. 
59 A light footprint approach is based on patient identification and systematic use of the human and institutional assets that 
do exist in the country concerned, even in post-conflict environments. The gaps in capacity and the operational inadequacies 
within the UN system are now reasonably well-known as a result of several reviews and reports. The creation of the 
peacebuilding commission is an attempt to begin to institutionalise some of these ideas and improve coordination, focus and 
funding for the work of the United Nations in post-conflict situations. Brahimi, L. 2007,p20. 
60 Paris R., Sisk, T.D. 2007. pI. 
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capacity to identify, respond to, and be accountable to, the broader society and its interests 
and not just the preferences of a narrow elite.61 
There has been increased criticism regarding the growing use of post-conflict countries as 
experiments for statebuilding. Some view it as a "new form of colonial control over the 
territory of war-tom states", while some of the strongest critiques against statebuilding see it 
as "a form of neo-imperialist or capitalist exploitation of vulnerable societies". Others have 
pointed to the mixed record of statebuilding, questioning whether it is worth the effort and 
resources. The mixed outcomes have also raised doubts about the prospects for 
peacebuilding and statebuilding, even in relatively favourable settings. 62 
Many African states in sub-Saharan Africa are described as hybrid political orders. This 
means that although "many are constitutional liberal democracies that operate according to 
formal, legally enforceable rules", they "co-exist with, or are overshadowed by, other 
competing forms of socio-political orders that have their roots in non-state, indigenous 
societal structures that rely on a web of social relations and mutual obligations to establish 
trust and reciprocity". 63 These states are not able to fulfil the three critical functions that the 
governments of all stable states perform; security, the provision of basic services, and the 
protection of essential freedoms.64 
The World Bank has created a low-income country under stress (UCUS) category, and 
identifies 25 states in this situation, including Angola. The concept has been questioned and 
criticised however, as being incomplete and not very useful. It is seen as having the 
deliberate intention of "imposing neo-liberal policies from outside or of exaggerating the 
danger that weaker states pose for the US and other western countries". It is also argued that 
"states are penalised for their weakness without taking into consideration the implications of 
economic globalisation and the economic models that are being imposed". Another criticism 
61 OECD, 2008. 
62 Paris, R., Sisk, T.D. 2007, p4 - p9; 
63 OECD, 2008. 
64 Eizenstat, S., Porter, J., Weinstein, J. Rebuilding Weak States, in Foreign Affairs, January/February 2005, Vol. 84, 
Number I, pI35-146. See also Hamre, 1.1., Sullivan, 2002, G.R. p136. 
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suggests that the administrative changes being forced on "weak" and "fragile" countries may 
not necessarily contribute to peace and security for the population as a whole.65 
Another major criticism against the current international peacebuilding paradigm is that it 
promotes "liberal internationalism", and assumes that the best way to consolidate peace is to 
transform states into stable market democracies as quickly as possible. Critics argue, 
however, that the limited success of many post-conflict peacebuilding processes is due to the 
destabilising effects generated by overly fast political and economic liberalisation processes 
in post-conflict societies that do not meet the necessary pre-conditions.66 
2.5. Peace milestones 
Researchers agree that the concept "post-conflict" is not easy to define. They draw a 
distinction between international wars (inter-state wars) and intra-state wars, where the end of 
a conflict is easier to mark, by peace treaty for example. In the case of intra-state wars, 
conflicts do not end as abruptly.67 Highlighting the definitional problems of the concept, and 
pointing out that low-intensity conflict could continue even after a conflict is supposed to 
have ended, scholars have suggested that two major events could be used to determine the 
beginning of a post-conflict period. The first is the immediate period following a landmark 
victory by either of the warring parties. The second is the date of signature of a 
comprehensive peace agreement between the warring parties. Researchers also suggest that 
65 Aguirre, M., Sogge, D. 2006. Crisis of the State and Civil Domains in Africa, FRIDE, Working Paper Number 30.pl, 
available at http://www.fride.orgipublication/246icrisis-of-the-state-and-civil-domains-in-africa. Accessed on 22 February 
2010. 
66 Similar arguments which have also been raised is that 'neo-liberal accumulation strategies' are not 'development oriented', 
stating further that "privatization, liberalization, public-private partnerships, surveillance-based good governance, a truncated 
individual rights based discourse and regular elections are all strategies to entrench the power of capital over society and the 
state". The promotion ofneo-liberal policies for Africa has been described as being the "essence and logic ofthe new 
scramble for Africa"; Satgar, V., Global Capitalism and the Neo-Liberalisation of Africa, in The New Scramble for Africa: 
Imperialism, Investment and Development in Africa, edited by Southall, R., Melber, H. University of KwaZulu Natal Press. 
67 Brown, G., Langer, A., Stewart, F. 2008. A Typology of Post-Conflict Environments: An Overview, CRISE Working 
Paper, No 53, London, p4. Available at http://www.crise.ox.ac.ukipubs/workingpaper53.pdf. Accessed on 21 February 
2010. A recent World Bank report reiterates this by pointing out that drawing a line between conflict and post-conflict is not 
easy. The apparent closure points to conflict, such as peace agreements or elections, rarely signal the clear beginning of a 
definable post-conflict reconstruction period. Rather there is a period of transition where peace must still be consolidated and 
ground laid before sustainable recovery can begin. Even among the countries with identified bank-financed 'post-conflict 
reconstruction' operations, about half are experiencing ongoing conflict. The World Bank's Experience with Post-Conflict 
Reconstruction . Available at 
http://lnweb90. worldbank.org/oed!oeddoclib.nsllDocUNIDViewF orJavaSearch/F753 E43 E728A27B3 8525681700503 796')0 
pendocument. Accessed on 10 August 2009. 
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the end of the post-conflict period generally refers to the end of the 10-year period following 
the end of a conflict. 68 
Some analysts suggest conceptualising post-conflict as "a process that involves the 
achievement of a range of peace milestones". In this way, 'post-conflict' countries could be 
viewed as lying on a transition continuum on which they sometimes move forward and at 
other times backwards. This would avoid placing such countries in "boxes" where they are 
either viewed as "in conflict" or "at peace".69 
The following are some peace milestones: 
Box 1 Peace milestones 
• Cessation of hostilities and violence; 
• Signing of political/peace agreement; 
• Demobilisation, disarmament and re-integration; 
• Refugee repatriation; 
• Establishing a functioning state; 
• Achieving reconciliation and social integration; and, 
• Economic recovery. 
Source: Brown, G., Langer A., Stewart, F. 2008: A Typology ofPost-Contlict Environments: 
An Overview, CRISE Working Paper No. 53, p4. 
68 Nkurunziza, 1. 2008. Civil War and Post-Contlict Reconstruction in Africa. United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development. Geneva: Switzerland. Available at http://www.afi:lb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdblDocuments/Knowl edge. The 
post-conflict phase can be divided into two sub-phases, the immediate aftermath of armed contlict (1-5 years) and the period 
after (5-10 years). 
69 Brown, G., Langer, A., Stewart, F. 2008. A Typology of Post-Conflict Environments: An Overview, CRISE Working 
Paper, No 53. London, p4. Available at http://www.crise.ox.ac.uk/pubs/workingpaper53.pdf. Accessed on 21 February 
2010. 
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-Indicators which could be used to assess the progress made towards achieving the peace 
milestones are listed in the table below: 
Table 1 Peace milestones and indicators of progress 
Peace milestones Possible indicators of progress 
Cessation of hostilities and violence • Reduction in the number of conflict fata lities 
• Reduction in the number of violent attacks 
• Time passed since major fighting stopped 
Signing of political/peace agreements • Signing of and adherence to ceasefire agreements 
• Signing and implementation of a comprehensive political 
agreement which addresses the causes of the contlict 
• Endorsement of peace/political agreement by all major factions 
and parties to the confl ict 
Demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration • No. of weapons handed in 
• No.lproportion of combatants released from military duty and 
returned to civi lian life 
• No.lproportion of combatants released from active duty and 
returned to barracks 
• No. of military barracks closed 
• Successfulness of reinsertion programs for ex-combatants 
• Reduction in total number of active so ldi ers/combatants 
• Spending cuts on military procurements 
Refugee repatriation • No.lproportion of displaced persons and refugees that have 
returned home voluntarily 
• No. of displaced persons and refugees sti ll living involuntarily 
in refugees centres within a conflict country or abroad 
Establi shing a functioning state • The extent to which impunity and lawlessness has been reduced 
• The extent to which the rule of law is introduced and 
maintained 
• The extent to which corruption has been reduced 
• Tax revenue as a proportion ofGDP 
Achieving reconciliation and societal integration • Number of violent incidents between groups 
• Perceptions of "others" via surveys 
• Extent of trust (via surveys) 
Economic recovery • Economic growth recovery 
• Increased revenue mobilisation 
• Restoring of economic infrastructure 
• Increased foreign direct investment 
Source: Brown, G., Langer A., Stewart, F. 2008: A Typology of Post-Conflict Environments: An Overview, CRISE Working 
Paper No. 53, p5. 
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These peace milestones should be viewed as processes, and the "activities and interventions" 
aimed at achieving the various milestones, can and should be undertaken even during the 
"conflict' phase itself,.7o 
Others have listed as major objectives for post-conflict recovery the provision of conditions 
to generate economic recovery and growth; generating employment and other economic 
opportunities, especially for youth; tackling horizontal inequalities, if severe; and managing 
natural resources and distributing the revenues in a transparent and equitable way. The latter 
is particularly relevant to countries rich in natural resources. 71 
2.6. Special features of post-conflict countries 
The United Nations Development Programme has identified some specific challenges of 
post-conflict development.72 A critical step is to tailor post-conflict reconstruction strategies 
to the specific circumstances of individual post-conflict countries. 73 
The effects and consequences of war makes the development challenges in a post-conflict 
country different and more difficult, than those faced by poor developing countries that have 
not experienced conflict, even though the problems presented in both situations appear 
similar. The context in which development programmes are implemented also differs 
between post-conflict countries and poor developing countries unaffected by conflict. UNDP 
highlights the following criteria that may be more severe in post-conflict countries than in 
'normal' developing countries. 
70 Brown, G., Langer, A., Stewart, F. 2008. A Typology of Post-Conflict Environments: An Overview, CRISE Working 
Paper, No 53. London, p4. Available at http://www.(;rise.ox.a(;.uk/pubs/workingpaper53.pdf. Accessed on 21 February 
2010. 
71 United Nations Development Programme, 2008, p42. Available at 
http://content.undp.org!go/newsrooml200S/october/new-report-provides-insights-on-post-contlict-economic-recovery.en. 
Accessed on 10 August 2009. 
72 United Nations Development Programme, 2008, p40. 
73 Security, political, institutional and economic factors all contribute to the unique characteristics of individual post-conflict 
countries. Security factors would include the nature of the conflict and its geographical scope; political factors would 
involve the nature of the peace settlement, and institutional factors refer to the character and strength of the state, while 
economic factors involves the level of development and impact of the conflict on economic activity. United Nations 
Development Programme, 2008. 
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Box 2 Characteristics of post-conflict countries 
• A lack of basic security and corresponding low levels of confidence among economic 
agents; 
• Low fiscal capacity due to administrative weaknesses and lack of political support, 
reducing the government's revenue and tax base; 
• A weak administration and judiciary that is unable to check illegal economic activity; 
• A high level of criminal activity, which often surges in post-conflict period, and much 
predatory behaviour among the elites, especially in resource-rich countries; 
• Sudden mass movements of people; and 
• Deep macro-economic challenges, often including large budget deficits, high inflation 
and a high debt burden. 
Source: United Nations Development Programme, 2008. Post-conflict economic recovery: enabling local 
ingenuity, p40-41 Available at 
http://content.undp.org/go/newsroom/2008/october/new-report-provides-insights-on-post-conflict-economic-
recovery. en. 
2.7. Post-conflict reconstruction challenges 
Each country emerging from conflict has a unique set of circumstances, and country-specific 
post-conflict reconstruction strategies should be developed to meet the needs of individual 
countries. 74 However, there are some issues which are common to all, including the critical 
key challenges in post-conflict environments listed below: 
• Legitimacy trust and authority of the state; 
• Political will for transparency and accountability; 
• Rule of law; 
74 UNDESA, 2007. Governance Strategies for Post-Conflict Reconstruction, Sustainable Peace and Development, p4. 
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• Social capital and social cohesion; 
• Reconciliation; 
• Economic reconstruction and service delivery structures; 
• Security and cross border movements; 
• Decentralisation. 
Some ofthe other challenges that are specific to post-conflict countries include the following: 
Box 3 Challenges for post-conflict countries 
• Generalised insecurity and armed violence; 
• High risk of armed conflict recurring; 
• Unexploded ordinance; 
• Armed groups contesting the legitimacy of the new government; 
• Wide-spread inter-group violence; 
• Massive destruction of infrastructure and institutions; 
• War (or warlord) economies; 
• Severe scarcity in human capacity (massive population displacement; IDPs, refugees, 
diasporas ); 
• Collapsed labour markets; and 
• Militarised international intervention. 
Source: United Nations Development Programme, 2008. Post-conjlict economic recovery: enabling local 
ingenuity, p40-41 Available at http://content. undp. org/go/newsroom/2008/october/new-report-provides-
insights-on-post-conjlict-economic-recovery. en. 
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Research has shown that low-income countries and countries with significant natural 
resources, face particular challenges in relation to post-conflict economic recovery. Low-
income countries have to deal with a tendency toward aid dependency due to the fact that it is 
generally difficult to generate adequate savings and therefore easier to depend on foreign 
flows of income for reconstruction and development. Private sources of funding are also 
more difficult to attract in these environments. On the other hand, although middle income 
post-conflict countries are also dependent on aid, it is mostly for the short term, as 
possibilities of renewed inflows of private capital tend to be greater, making it easier to 
escape from aid dependency. Another major obstacle to successful recovery is the scarcity of 
human resources, making the recovery of service delivery difficult as well as leading to a 
weak bureaucratic capacity. 75 
The financial needs of countries with significant natural resources are much smaller than that 
of low-income countries. The major threat they face, however, for a recurrence of conflict, is 
if there is a presence of high horizontal inequalities. The macro-economic policies of these 
countries are also affected by 'Dutch disease', making it difficult to diversify the economy, 
and generally undermining the growth of non-oil sectors. These countries need special 
policies to help manage resources that could assist with making them developmentally 
effective and inclusive, as well as to reduce the likelihood of renewed conflict.76 
Scholars have also suggested that post-conflict societies face two major challenges -
economic recovery and risk reduction 77. A study focusing on these areas have concluded that 
"both the post-conflict government and external actors should give priority to reducing the 
risk of conflict". Statistical results of the study found that economic development does not 
necessarily reduce the risk of a relapse into conflict. The study also found that there was no 
systematic influence of elections on the reduction of war risk. They therefore suggest that 
75 Brown, G., Langer, A., Stewart, F. 2008, p7-9. 
76 Brown, G., Langer, A., Stewart, F. 2008, p12. 
77 Collier, P., Hoeffier, A., Soderbom, M. 2006, "Post-conflict Risks", Centre for the Study of African Economics, 
Department of Economics, University of Oxford, London. Available at http;//www.csae.ox.ac.uk/workingpapers/pdfs!2006-
12text.pdf. Accessed on 10 August 2009. 
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elections should be promoted as "intrinsically desirable, rather than as mechanisms for 
increasing the durability ofthe post-conflict peace".78 
2.8. Conclusion 
There are no quick-fix solutions to the complex realities faced by a growing number of 
African states emerging from protracted conflicts. The sharp decline in conflicts across 
Africa has coincided with the continent experiencing for the first time in 30 years economic 
growth in tandem with the rest of the world, and recording its highest economic growth rate 
for this decade in 2007 at 6.7%.79 In 2007, Angola and Sudan, previously the sites of 
Africa's longest running civil wars, featured among the 10 largest economies in Africa. 8o 
Given the increased global momentum towards statebuilding, it is also imperative for the 
region to develop a unified, co-ordinated and coherent African approach and perspective to 
post-conflict processes taking place on the continent. However, whether post-conflict 
reconstruction is seen as a vehicle to promote statebuilding or not, the fact remains that it is 
necessary in post-conflict societies to build effective systems and institutions of government. 
African states should endeavour to perform the essential functions of a state and government, 
most importantly focusing on the provision of basic services to their citizens. The improved 
economic performance of individual states, such as that of Angola and Sudan cited above, 
and the contribution this makes to improved economic performance for the region, will only 
then be a real cause for celebration. 
78 Collier, P., Hoeftler, A., Soderbom, M. 2006, p2. 
79 The World Bank, 2008. Africa's Development Indicators 2007. Available at 
http://ncws.bbc.co.uk/2/sharcd/bsp/hilpdfsil4 II 07 africa dcv.pdf. Accessed on 8 March 2010. Average growth in the 
Sub-Saharan economies was 5.4% in 2005 and 2006. See also Reuters, 2007. IMF sees post-war states as priority in Africa. 
Available at http://www.alertnet.orgithenews/newsdesklLl4872796.htm. Accessed on 8 March 2010. 
80 Africa's 10 largest economies in 2007. Available at http://www.clickafrigue.comiMagazine/STO 14iCP0000002788.aspx. 
Accessed on 10 March 2010. 
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Chapter 3. Angola: An overview 
3.1. Introduction 
Angola's81 recent past will impact greatly how its future unfolds. The country's history has 
been shaped by its experience as a Portuguese colony, the politics of the Cold War, and more 
than four decades of armed conflict. In 1975, the country gained its independence from 
Portugal, after a 14-year long liberation struggle. A 27-year long civil war followed, and 
culminated in the signing of the Luena Peace Agreement in April 2002. 
This chapter will provide a brief overview of Angola's independence struggle as well as its 
civil war, and the legacy left by the country's armed conflict of more than 40 years. 
3.2. The road to independence 
Two massacres in the Uige and Malange provinces in 1961 provided the catalyst for Angola's 
first war, the War for Independence. It also gave rise to Angola's three liberation 
movements: the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)82; the National 
Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA)83; and the National Union for the Total 
Independence of Angola (UNITA)84, which formed in response to colonial repression, racial 
81 Modem Angola derives its name from the Kingdom of Ndongo, ruled by the Ngola (king). The Portuguese gradually took 
control of the coastal strip throughout the 16th century by a series of treaties and wars and the territory became known as 
Angola in 1574. Angola is on the west coast of Africa, bordering Namibia, Zambia, the Democratic Republic Of Congo, and 
Republic Of Congo. Its population is nearly 14 million, of whom the largest ethnic group is Ovimbundu. Other ethnic 
groups are Kimbundu, Bakongo, Mestiqo (mix - European/African); European, and others. The official language is 
Portuguese, and Umbundu, Kimbundu and Kikongo are widely spoken. Christianity is the main religion. Meijer, G., 
Binningham, D. 2004. Angola Past to Present, in From Military Peace to Social Justice? The Angolan Peace Process, 
Accord, Issue IS, London. 
82 The MPLA was fonned in the late 1950s from smaller resistance movements operating in Luanda. Meijer, G., 
Binningham, D. 2004. Angola Past to Present, in From Military Peace to Social Justice? The Angolan Peace Process, 
Accord, Issue 15, London. 
83 The FNLA was fonned in 1962, under the leadership of Holden Roberto. Meijer, G., Binningham, D. 2004. Angola Past 
to Present, in From Military Peace to Social Justice? The Angolan Peace Process, Accord, Issue 15, London. 
84 UNIT A was founded by Jonas Savimbi in 1966. Previously Savimbi was the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the 
Revolutionary Government of Angola in exile (GRAE) fonned in 1962 by the FNLA. Savimbi then built up his own 
constituency in the centre and south of the country. His supporters came mainly from the largest ethnic group, the 
Ovimbundu. Meijer, G., Binningham, D. 2004. Angola Past to Present, in From Military Peace to Social Justice? The 
Angolan Peace Process, Accord, Issue IS, London. 
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policies and other discriminatory practices.85 The liberation movements not only fought the 
colonisers, but also engaged in a bitter power struggle among themselves for international 
recognition and national legitimacy. In addition to adopting different ideologies, each 
organisation was dominant in different parts of the country, and had an ethnically-based 
support base. Conditions of tolerance, openness and debate were also absent within the 
structures of the liberation movements.86 
Fought mainly with guerrilla tactics, the independence struggle lasted until 1974. 
Commentators suggest that the armed movements did not pose any real threat to the colonial 
state, and that it was really a change in the national political arena in Portugal that brought the 
colonial period to an end. The Alvor Agreement87 signed by all three parties in Portugal 
paved the way for independence on 11 November 1975. The Agreement made provision for 
a power-sharing transitional government, comprising the MPLA, UNIT A and FLNA, a new 
constitution and elections.88 
On 11 November 1975, excluding both UNITA and the FNLA from government and the city 
of Luanda, the MPLA declared Angola's independence and installed Agostinho Neto as its 
first President. A socialist one-party regime was established. Brazil was the first country to 
recognise the new government, followed in 1976 by the Organisation of African Unity 
(OAU), the United Nations (UN), Portugal, and more than 80 countries which officially 
recognised the new Angolan government. Following President Neto's death by natural 
causes in 1979, Jose Eduardo dos Santos, at the time the Minister of Planning, became 
president. 89 
85 Angola: Post-Conflict Challenges, Country Assessment Report, UNHCRI AUINEP AD Sub Cluster on Post-Conflict 
Reconstruction and Development, March 2008, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, pIS 
86 Angola: Post-Conflict Challenges, Country Assessment Report, March 2008, p 16. 
87 The Alvor Accords - the agreement between the MPLA, UNITA, FNLA, and the Government ofPortugaI, signed on 15 
January 1975, in Alvor, Portugal. Key texts and Agreements, In From Military Peace to Social Justice? The Angolan Peace 
Process, Accord, Issue IS, London, p68. 
88 Meijer, G., Birmingham, D. 2004. Angola Past to Present, in From Military Peace to Social Justice? The Angolan Peace 
Process, Accord, Issue 15, London, p13. 
89 Meijer, G., Birmingham, D. 2004, piO. See also Angola: Post-Conflict Challenges, March 2008, p16. 
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The country's long civil war started almost immediately after independence, with the collapse 
of the Alvor Agreement.90 
3.3. Angola's civil wars 
The power struggle between Angola's different elites is generally viewed as having been the 
driving force behind the country's protracted war. With support from their international 
backers, each of the liberation movements wanted to be in control of the country. The 
MPLA, with the support of the Soviet Union and Cuban troops, was able to gain the upper 
hand over UNIT A and the FNLA, and had extended its control over all 18 provinces by April 
1976. South African troops supported UNITA, and Angola's neighbour, Zaire, backed the 
FNLA. Between 1976 to 1989, during the country's 'second war', Cold War politics were 
evident in the struggle between the MPLA, which had a Marxist-Leninist orientation and 
enjoyed support from the Soviet Union and Cuba, and UNIT A, whose support came mainly 
from the West, and South Africa. 91 UNITA was dominant in the interior of Angola and its 
rural areas, while the MPLA was mainly based in the cities.92 
A change in military tactics by the end of the 1980' s, involved targeting civilians. UNIT A 
subsequently lost most of its Western supporters as a result of its vicious attacks on civilians, 
which claimed the lives of between 100 000 and 300 000 people. The US, however, 
continued its support to UNITA until the end of the Cold War in 1989. The battle for Cuito 
Cuanavale in 1987 presents a defining moment in Angola's second war. With the assistance 
of Cuban troops, the MPLA was able to push back South African and UNIT A forces after a 
long battle. Conceding that there seemed to be no prospect for a military solution to the 
security of their northern border, South Africa started to explore political alternatives. A 
troika of Portugal, the United States and the Soviet Union, managed the peace initiatives 
which followed, and this resulted in the Bicesse Accords of May 1991. The defeat of the 
South Africans atCuito Caunavale also led to an agreement between Angola, South Africa 
90 Meijer, G., Binningham, D. 2004.pI3. 
91 Angola: Post-Conflict Challenges, Country Assessment Report, March 2008, p17. 
92 Meijer, G., Binningham, D. 2004, piS. 
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and Cuba that provided for the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola and South African 
troops from Namibia. 93 
The peace accord was followed by the country's first general elections in 1992, held under 
the auspices of the UN. UNITA's Savimbi expected to win, and when the results turned out 
in favour of the MPLA, he rejected the voting results and returned to war. The 1994 Lusaka 
Protocol brought an end to the war, creating a four year break from open hostilities, before 
the 'third war' broke out in December 1998. Only with the assassination of Jonas Savimbi in 
February 2002, was the door to peace re-opened, and with the signing of the Luena 
Memorandum in April 2002, four decades of war finally ended.94 
3.4. Peace processes 
Attempts at ending Angola's conflict are evident in the three peace accords produced 
between 1989 and 2002. All three peace processes failed however. The extensive 
involvement of the international community in the creation of first two accords, and its 
minimal involvement with the third accord, the Luena Agreement, has been pointed out as 
one of the reasons for the failure of the first two accords and the success of the last attempt.95 
Key features ofthe peace accords are briefly described below. 
3.4.1 The Bicesse Accords 
The MPLA and UNITA signed the Bicesse Accords in May 1991. The Accords prohibited 
both sides from purchasing weapons. The US and the Soviet Union also had to end their 
military support to the parties. Under the Accord, the MPLA was authorised to continue as 
the government until the country's first general election, set for September 1992, was held. 
The UN's peacekeeping mission, UNAVEM II, was responsible for: i) overseeing the 
93 Angola: Post-Contlict Challenges, Country Assessment Report, March 2008, p17. See also Meijer, G., Birmingham, D. 
2004, p15. Several protocols and agreements were signed by South Africa, Cuba and Angola, including the New York 
principles of20 July 1988; the Geneva Protocol of 5 August 2008; the Brazzaville Protocol of 13 December 1988; and the 
Bilateral and Tripartite Agreements both signed on 22 December 1988. Key texts and Agreements, in From Military Peace 
to Social Justice? The Angolan Peace Process, Accord, Issue 15, London, p68. 
94 Angola: Post-Conflict Challenges, Country Assessment Report, March 2008, p15. 
95 Meijer, G., Birmingham, D. 2004, p15. 
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demobilisation and reintegration of soldiers; ii) reform of the police services; and iii) 
assisting with preparations for the elections. However, due to the lack of adequate resources, 
as well as a weak mandate, UNA VEM II, a central component of the peace arrangements, 
could not successfully fulfil its mission. 
Given that the minimum political and military conditions for conducting elections were not in 
place, the realistic action would have been to postpone the elections. The US, however, 
expected that UNIT A would win the elections, and therefore, no real effort was made to 
amend any of the provisions contained in the Accords. With UNIT A's defeat in the election, 
and its rejection of the election result, the MPLA won significant support among local 
communities. However, it was not until UNITA's rejection of the Abidjan Protocol (in mid-
1993), that the US recognised the MPLA as the legitimate government of Angola, paving the 
way for UN sanctions against UNIT A. 96 
3.4.2 Lusaka Protocol of 1994 
Realising a reversal of fortunes, UNIT A called for new peace talks in October 1993. The UN 
representative, Alioune Blondin Beye, supported by the Troika, led peace negotiations in 
November 1993.97 Savimbi, suffering several military setbacks, and under increasing 
international pressure, signed the Lusaka Protocol in November 1994. Similar to the Bicesse 
Accords, no allowance was provided for other stakeholders to contribute to discussions 
relating to the Lusaka Protocol. Key elements of the Protocol were blatantly defied by both 
UNIT A and the Angolan Government. One of the key breaches of the Protocol was 
UNITA's refusal to disarm. At the end of December 1998, the Angolan government declared 
its 'war of peace' .98 
96 Meijer, M., Birmingham, D. 2004.pI9-20; See also "Angola" in Compendium of Elections in Southern Africa (2002), 
edited by Tom Lodge, Denis Kadima and David Pottie, EISA, 17-18. Available at 
http://www.eisa.org.za/WEP/angI99Ibicesse.htm. Accessed on 8 March 20 I O. 
97 Meijer, G., Birmingham, D. 2004.pI9-20. 
98 Meijer, G., Birmingham, D. 2004.p22, 
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3.4.3 The Luena Peace Agreement 
Jonas Savimbi's assassination on 22 February 2002 by Angolan government military forces 
created the space for re-engaging in peace talks. Following his death, a ceasefire was 
announced on 2 March 2002, followed by the Angolan government declaration on 13 March 
2002 of an end to all its military operations against UNITA, and a peace plan. Included in the 
peace plan were calls for the resolution of outstanding military issues in accordance with the 
Bicesse Accords and Lusaka Protocol, UNIT A's demilitarization and reintegration into 
political life, and an amnesty for all crimes committed in the framework of the armed 
conflict. It also pledged to work with all of society, especially the churches, political parties 
and civil society groupS.99 
On 4 April 2002, the Luena Memorandum marked the end of four decades of war and the 
ultimate defeat of UNITA. In October 2002, UNITA declared itself fully disarmed and a 
democratic political party and UN sanctions against it were lifted. 
3.S. Cabinda 
Commentators suggest that peace in Angola remains incomplete without the resolution of the 
ongoing conflict in Cabinda. Accounting for 60 percent of Angola's oil production, the 
prospects for the Angolan government granting autonomy to the region is unlikely. 
The struggle for the independence of Cabinda stretches over 30 years, with the formation of 
the Front for the Liberation of Cabinda Enclave (FLEC) in 1974, and its rejection of the 
Alvor Accords that included Cabinda as part of Angolan territory at independence. Since 
1975, FLEC has been spearheading the campaign for an independent Cabinda, using guerrilla 
tactics, selective attacks against government targets, and even kidnapping foreigners to focus 
media attention on their cause. In 2003 fighting between the FLEC separatists and the 
Government of Angola intensified. However, a peace agreement was signed in August 2006, 
99 Griffiths, A. 2004. The end of the war: The Luena Memorandum of Understanding, in, From Military Peace to Social 
Justice? The Angolan Peace Process, Accord, Issue 15, London, p24. 
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between the Angolan government and the Cabindan Forum for Dialogue (FCD), to bring 
about an end to the armed conflict. 100 
3.6. Legacy of the war: Angola today 
Angola's wars have left a tragic legacy. Forty years of armed conflict have cost the lives of 
more than 1.5 million people, about 12 percent of the population. Almost one-third of the 
population were internally displaced, and about 450 000 thousand people became refugees in 
neighbouring countries. Zambia and the DRC hosted the largest number of Angolan 
refugees. Angola is now the most mined country in sub-Saharan Africa and among the 
highest worldwide, with the number of landmines estimated to be between six and eight 
million. One in 415 people in Angola has been injured as a result of landmines, with an 
estimated 800 000 people having lost a limb due to land mine injury. In addition, the 
proliferation of landmines is also impacting on the resettlement of and reintegration of 
refugee communities into Angolan society, as well as on agricultural production due to 
inaccessible areas and roadS. IOI 
The damage to physical infrastructure has also been severe. Soldiers from both sides targeted 
communication and transport facilities such as airports, seaports, roads and railways, bridges 
and telecommunications. Power supplies were also affected because of attacks on hydro-
electric plants. Houses, schools and hospitals were destroyed. In addition, due to the war, 
the existing infrastructure was neglected, with government spending geared towards the war 
effort and neglecting expenditure on areas such as infrastructure. 102 
Tragically, the war also deepened poverty among the population. About 68 percent of the 
Angolan population live below the poverty line, and 28 percent live in extreme poverty. 
Angola's war efforts were mainly funded by oil-backed loans, and this has further increased 
the country's national debt level. By 2004, Angola's external debt was estimated at US$9.4 
100 Angola: Post-Conflict Challenges, Country Assessment Report, March 2008,p21. See also Meijer, G., Birmingham, D. 
2004, p15. 
101 Angola: Post-Conflict Challenges, Country Assessment Report, March 2008, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, p25. 
102 Angola: Post-Conflict Challenges, Country Assessment Report, March 2008, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, p28. 
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billion. Exports in commodities such as coffee also declined from significant levels before 
the war. The fishing industry, also a major export commodity, was also affected, with earlier 
exports of 600 000 tons declining to only 30 000 tons during the war. 103 
Angola's children have suffered the most. A recent study, found that 10 percent of the 
country's children have fought in the war, 85 percent have seen dead bodies, 84 percent 
suffered from malnutrition with nearly half of under five-year olds malnourished. One third 
of Angolan children between the ages of 5 to 14 are working. 104 Three in five people do not 
have access to safe water and sanitation. About one in four Angolan children die before their 
fifth birthday, with 90 percent dying because of malaria, diarrhoea or respiratory tract 
infections. lOS 
Angola does not have a democratic government. Although it is structured along the lines of a 
conventional democracy, political power remains concentrated in the hands of the President. 
The executive branch of the government consists of the President (head of state and 
government), the Prime Minister, and a Council of Ministers. The central government 
administers the country through 18 provinces. The MPLA is the dominant party in 
parliament with 129 seats, followed by UNITA with 70, the Party for Social Renewals with 6, 
and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) with 5. A few smaller political 
parties are also represented. 106 
3.7. Conclusion 
The Luena Peace Agreement of 2002 provided an opportunity for Angola to redress some of 
the legacies left by its colonisers, anti-colonial struggle, and civil war. Included in the 
Angolan government's agenda for creating a new Angola, is changing the country's mostly 
103 Angola: Post-Conflict Challenges, Country Assessment Report, March 2008, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, p28-30. 
104 Angola: Post-Conflict Challenges, Country Assessment Report, March 2008, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, p27 - 31. 
105 World Bank, 2006. Angola: Country Economic Memorandum - Oil, Broad-based Growth, and Equity; piii. Available at 
http://www-
wds. worldbank.org!externalldefaultlWDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2006110/24/000090341 200610241 04820/Rendered/PD 
F/35362.pdf. Accessed on 10 August 2009. 
106 Shaxson, N., Neves, J., Pacheco, F. 2008. Drivers of Change - Angola: Final Report, London, p II. 
Available at mirror.undp.org/angolaiLinkRtflDrivers-of-Change-Angola.doc. Accessed on 12 March 2010, p4 and p30. 
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negative image, from being one of the world's most corrupt and poorly governed states, as 
well as one of the world's most unequal societies, to one of a nation that is respected by its 
neighbours and the global community.107 This goal will only be achieved by addressing the 
country's poor governance record, overcoming institutional weaknesses, creating better 
socio-economic conditions, and most importantly, improving the lives of Angola's poor by a 
more equitable distribution of the country's wealth to benefit the entire population. 
107 Sogge, D. 2009. Angola 'Failed yet Successful', FRIDE Working Paper, Madrid, p I. Available at 
http;llwww.fride.org/publication/599!angola-failed-vet-successful. Accessed on 21 February 2010. 
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Chapter 4. Angola's post-conflict development and 
reconstruction strategies 
4.1. Introduction 
In its quest to attain long-term peace, security and development, Angola will have to address 
an infinite range of post-conflict challenges. The Angolan government, as the main driver of 
post-conflict reconstruction in the country, has developed its own home-grown post-conflict 
strategies and frameworks to advance the country's post-conflict recovery process. 
This chapter will focus on some of the key programmes that have been developed. These 
programmes aim to address the challenges identified by the government and include those 
related to: i) peace, justice, democracy, social stability, national unity and cohesion, and 
internal security; ii) elimination of hunger and extreme poverty, employment, economic 
growth and fair distribution of national income; iii) sustainable long-term development, 
human development and well being for all Angolans and harmonious development of the 
territory; iv) good and transparent governance; v) Angola a country with a future, respected 
by neighbours, by partners, by the entire international community, and increasingly integrated 
into the world economy. 108 
4.2. Angola's post-conflict reconstruction strategies 
4.2.1 The International Donor Conference for Rehabilitation 
One of the first steps the Angolan government took immediately following the Luena Peace 
Agreement of April 2002, was to call for an International Donor Conference for 
Rehabilitation, seeking in this way assistance from the international community to support 
108 United Nations Development Assistance Framework in Angola, UNDAF, Angola: 2009-2013, April 2009, p6. Available 
at http://mirror.undp.org/angolaiLinkRtflUNDAF-AO-2009 2013-En.pdt: Accessed on 10 February 2010. 
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the country in meeting its most immediate and pressing post-war demands. l09 By the end of 
2002 the Government had prepared its Post-conflict Rehabilitation and Reconstruction 
programme (PRR) and intended to make it a base document for discussion at the International 
Donor Conference. The PRR priority phase features a list of vital projects, (see Table 2), to 
rebuild the country's infrastructure and extend state administration throughout Angola. The 
donor conference has, however, to date not materialised. I 10 
4.2.2 The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)/New Partnership for Africa's 
Development (NEPAD) Report 
In July 2003, the Government launched the Angola 2003 MDGINEPAD Report. The 
document provides a baseline of indicators against which progress will be measured until 
2015. A 2005 MDG Report was also prepared. I I I Both documents provide important 
indicators relating to Angola's progress toward achieving the Millennium Development 
Goals ll2 , highlighting key policies and programmes that have been adopted, as well as some 
of the remaining challenges. 
4.2.3 The Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
One of the main national policy frameworks developed by the Government for the immediate 
post-conflict period was its Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). Initially the 
government had prepared two Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers. Both were not 
approved by the International Monetary Fund (lMF), or received any endorsement from 
donors. The government then moved on to develop a full PRSP which received clearance by 
109 United Nations Development Programme, 2005. Economic Report on Angola in 2002-2004: Defusing the Remnants of 
War, p I. Available at bttp://mirror.undp.org/angolaiLinkRtf/ang ecort-ll.2005 .pdf . Accessed on 10 February 20 I O. 
110 Shaxson, N., Neves, J., Pacheco, F. 2008, P II. 
III Angola: Millennium Development Goals - Report Summary 2005. Available at 
bttp://mirror.undp.org/angolaiLinkRtfiMDGANG2005-cng.pdf. Accessed on 10 September 2009. 
112 The eight millennium goals arc I) eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; 2) achieve universal primary education; 3) 
promote gender equality and empower women; 4) reduce cbild mortality; 5) improve maternal health; 6) combat HIV/AIDS, 
malaria and other diseases; 7) ensure environmental sustainability; and 8) develop a global partnership for development. 
Millennium Report ofthe Secretary-General of the United Nations. Available at 
htttp://www.un.org/millennium/sg/report/summ.htm. Accessed on 10 September 2009. 
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the Angolan Council of Ministers in January 2004. Thereafter, the government started the 
implementation of its PRSP in the absence of donor support. I 13 
The final version of the Government's PRSP, also known as the Estrategia de Combate a 
Pobreza (ECP), or Strategy to Combat Poverty, was released in January 2004 and covers the 
period 2004 to 2006. The ECP, PRR and MDG documents are linked and provide a joint 
means by which the government would pursue both its immediate post-conflict recovery and 
medium-term growth. For example, the expenses of PRR projects that relate to poverty 
reduction would be taken up by the ECP. 
Also, the government's Public Investment Programme (PIP) would on an annual basis 
provide funding for those items that were to be carried by the State budget. Ten sectors were 
listed for priority action and support in the PRR, with the total ECP cost estimated at 
US$3.17 billion over five years. I 14 The three-year emergency rehabilitation plans prepared 
by the country's provinces, as well as the UN Common Country Assessment (CCA) reports, 
also informed the final PRSP .115 
113 In 2005, the donor community provided an estimated €287 million in aid to Angola. In the same year, public expenditure 
by the Angolan government amounted to an estimated €8.16 billion (or US$ 10.159 billion). Comparing these figures shows 
donor aid is about 3.5% of the Angolan public expenditure budget. The figures for donor aid have not improved in recent 
years, in fact they have shown a decline. Republic of Angola - European Community, 2008. Country Strategy Paper and 
National Indicative Programme for the period 2008 - 2013, Annex la: Key Macro-economic Indicators, p8. Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu!development/icenter!repositOly/scanned ao csp 10 en.pdf. Accessed on 8 February 2010. 
114 United Nations Development Programme, 2005. Economic Report on Angola in 2002-2004: Defusing the Remnants of 
War, p8-9. 
1\5 Ibid. 
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Table 2 PRR priority phase - list of vital projects 
Activity Cost (in US Dollars) 
Resettlement-Social Reinsertion, including support for return of four million 350 million 
internally displaced persons (IDPs); 450 000 refugees; demobilisation and 
reinsertion of ex-soldiers and families 
De-mining. The programme mentions 4,750000 landmines, 26 000 kms of 285 million 
roads infested with mines 
Food security and rural development 70 million 
HIV/AIDS 71 million 
Education - with a focus on primary universal education 450 million 
Health - programmes seek rapid access to basic health services 158 million 
Rehabilitation of basic infrastructure; new housing schemes 1, 038 million 
Employment and professional training 45 million 
Governance: extend access to justice to all areas of the territory - Public 325 million 
Administration reform - decentralisation - modernise the management of the 
PIP - support to the statistics system, new set of accounts 
Economic management: overhaul the financial system and extend financial 60 million 
services to rural areas and small business - modernise the public finance 
system 
Source: United Nations Development Programme, 2005. Economic Report on Angola in 2002-2004: Defusing 
the Remnants of War, p8-9, Available at http://mirror.undp.org/angola/LinkRtjlang_ecorep.2005.pdJ 
The PRSP identifies ten priority areas of intervention: i) social integration; ii) security and 
civil protection; iii) food security and rural development; iv) HIV/AIDS; v) education; vi) 
health; vii) basic infrastructure; viii) employment and vocational training; ix) good 
governance; and x) macro-economic management. I 16 
Through the PRSP, the Government intends to: 
• Support the return and resettlement of internally displaced persons, refugees and 
demobilized soldiers to their areas of origin, or preferred locations, where they can 
integrate themselves into the community in a sustainable manner; 
116 See Republic of Angola - European Community, 2008, p24. 
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• Guarantee basic physical security through demining, disarmament and the upholding of 
law and order throughout the country; 
• Minimise food insecurity and re-launch the rural economy as a key aspect to sustainable 
development; 
• Control the spread of HI VIA IDS and minimise the problems of those families living with 
AIDS; 
• Provide universal access to quality primary education that is gender sensitive whilst 
reducing illiteracy and creating the conditions for the protection of youth with special 
needs; 
• Improve the health situation of the population by increasing access to primary health care 
and focus on the control and spread of HI VIA IDS; 
• Rehabilitate and expand basic infrastructures for economIC, social and human 
development; 
• Value national human resources, protect workers' rights, promote access to employment 
opportunities and enhance the labour market; 
• Consolidate the rule of law through improvements to the administration and the 
management of resources whilst promoting transparency in the development of national 
documents; 
• Create an enabling environment for stable macro-economic growth that allows a steady 
development of the markets ensuring the reduction of poverty. 117 
4.2.4 Medium-term strategy 
Having made progress with some of its key short-term and emergency priorities such as 
maintaining macro-economic stability, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration 
(DDR), and rebuilding vital physical infrastructure, the government in its medium-term 
117 United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), Angola: 2005 - 2008, p7-8. 
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development plan, is able to prioritise more specific measures for addressing the country's 
human development needs. During the transition l18 period the Angolan government will 
focus on: i) promoting sustainable human development; ii) improving socio-economic 
conditions; iii) promoting governance and rule of law; iv) creating economic stability for 
poverty reduction and sustainable long-term development; and v) working towards 
sustainable use of environmental resources. I 19 
The Government's specific plans for promoting sustainable human development include 
improving its Human Development Index (HDI) ranking by 30 points in order for the country 
to join the level of medium development countries by 2025. It also aims to reduce poverty by 
up to 75 percent, the infant mortality rate by 90 percent, its under-five mortality rate by 85 
percent l20, its maternal mortality rate by up to 95 percent, increase life expectancy by at least 
10 to 12 years, and reverse the spread ofHIV/AIDS.12I 
Promoting governance and rule of law will be achieved by improving governance efficiency 
and by reducing its ranking in corruption indices, such as that of Transparency International 
and the World Bank. Improving access to justice and promoting human rights are also 
planned. 122 
Creating economic stability is a key factor influencing the government's ability to ensure 
poverty reduction and sustainable long-term development. The government intends among 
other to support private sector development, entrepreneurship and capacity development, 
reform the planning and macro-economic management systems, and improve national 
118 The African Union Policy on Post-Contlict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) distinguish three phases within a 
post-conflict reconstruction and development process, namely: the emergency (short-term); transition (medium-term); and 
development (long-term) phases. Report on the Elaboration of a Policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development, 
Available at http://www.africa-
union.org/root/au!Conferences/2007/july/PCRD!Report%200n%20Post%20 contlict%20reconstruction . pdf. Accessed on 10 
March 2010. 
119 United Nations Development Assistance Framework in Angola, UNDAF Angola: 2009-2013, April 2009, p6 
120 About 195 000 children die every year before the age of five. Republic of Angola - European Community, 2008. Annex 
15: Children and Development, p65. Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repositorvlscanned ao csp 10 en. pdf. Accessed on 2 March 2010. 
121 United Nations, DPIDCP/AGO/2, 2008. Draft country programme for Angola (2009-2013), p2. Available at 
www.undp.org/execbrd/wordIDPDCPAG02.doc. Accessed on 21 February 2010. 
122 United Nations, DP/DCP/AGO/2, 2008, p3. 
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statistics. 123 Plans for achieving the sustainable use of its environmental resources include 
developing an environmental impact assessment (EIA), as well as an environmental 
management system (EMs).124 
Ongoing challenges during the transition period include maintaining internal security, unity 
and national cohesion. Creating a respectable image for the government within the region, 
and at a global level, are also part of the Angolan government's agenda. 125 
4.2.5 Long-term plans 
In addition to the above frameworks, the Government is preparing, in collaboration with the 
country's main political parties and civil society, its long-term strategy, known also as Vision 
2025. This strategy outlines the broad reforms which need to be implemented in Angola over 
the next two decades. These include large-scale reforms (generally macro-economic), sector 
reforms, and a new innovation called "matrix reforms,,126. Indicators and targets for the 
various reforms have been set up to 2025. 127 
Some of its more specific strategies and development plans in the important areas of 
disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration; health; education; financial management; 
decentralisation; macro-economic challenges; and governance are discussed in more detail 
below. 
123 United Nations, DPIDCP/AGO/2, 2008, p3. 
124 Water resources are a major asset of the country. Angola's internal renewable water resources are estimated at 140 
km3/yr, and are a major contributor to international river basins (Zambezi, Okavango, Cunene). Marine water resources and 
fisheries account for 2 to 3% ofGDP. Forests cover 43% of the country area, and over 5000 plant species have been 
recorded. See Republic of Angola - European Community, 2008, p20. 
125 United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), Angola: 2009 - 2013, p7. 
126 Matrix reforms is a new innovation that attempts to look at key issues such as poverty, hunger and human capital as a mix 
of policies that need to be undertaken under different ministries. Republic of Angola - European Community, 2008, p25. 
127 United Nations Development Programme, 2005. Economic Report on Angola in 2002-2004: Defusing the Remnants of 
War, p9. See also Republic of Angola - European Community, 2008,p25. Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/developmcntiiccnter/repositorv/scanned ao csplO cn.pd[ 
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4.3. Select strategies and development plans for key priority areas 
4.3.1 Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration 
Angola's DDR process was carried out mainly by the Angolan government. Provisions in the 
Luena Peace Agreement guided the DDR process and included: disengagement, quartering 
and conclusion of the demilitarisation of UNIT A military forces; integration into the FAA of 
UNITA military personnel; integration into the National Police, demobilisation and 
extinction of the UNIT A military forces; and social and vocational reintegration of 
demobilised ex-UNITA military forces. A Joint Military Commission and Technical 
Committee were given the responsibility to coordinate and implement the provisions.!28 
The Angolan government had in January 2001 already adopted a domestic law, the Norms for 
the Resettlement of Internally Displaced Populations!29, and in 2002 its implementing 
regulation. The law defined a number of pre-conditions necessary for resettlement of 
demobilised soldiers, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and returning refugees. 130 
The governments Peace Plan, launched in March 2002, also provided a framework for DDR 
to take place, including the preparation of an Emergency Programme to support the DDR and 
general reintegration processes. It also announced its Programme to Overcome the Crisis, 
especially focusing on the establishment of a Public Investment Programme, especially aimed 
at facilitating the rapid reconstruction of the country.!3! In 2006, the government supported 
by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), officially launched the 
Sustainable Reintegration Initiative, aimed at addressing key development gaps in the eight 
main districts of refugee return. Detailed assessments were compiled in each district to 
128 Key texts and Agreements, in From Military Peace to Social Justice? The Angolan Peace Process, Accord, Issue IS, 
London, p73-74. 
129 The government adopted in January 200 I a domestic law, the Norms for the Resettlement of Internally Displaced 
Populations, and the implementing regulation in 2002. In doing so, Angola became the first country in the world to 
incorporate the United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement into domestic law, and extended the application 
of those principals to the treatment of returning refugees. Human Rights Watch. Coming Home: Return and Reintegration in 
Angola, Vol. (17) 2, March 2005, p9. Available at http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/200SI03116/coming-home-O?print. 
Accessed on 10 March 2010. 
130 The five provinces most affected were Luanda, Benguela, Lunda Norte, Huambo, and Kwanza Sui, receiving a combined 
total of2.S million displaced people. Gomes Porto, 1., Parsons, I., Alden, C. 2007, pxv. 
131 Key texts and Agreements, in From Military Peace to Social Justice? The Angolan Peace Process, Accord, Issue 15, 
London, p73-74. 
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highlight major gaps in social services, transport infrastructure and economic opportunities, 
and to identify key development priorities in line with existing national and provincial 
plans. 132 
4.3.2 De-mining 
The Council of Ministers approved in 2006, a Mine Action Plan for the period 2006 to 201l. 
Other initiatives by the government in the area of de-mining include: the establishment of the 
CNIDAH - the national authority for mine action; and the establishment of INAD - which is 
responsible among other for de-mining operations and managing the national mine action 
training centre. An Executive Commission for Demining (CED) was also established in 
2005. 133 
De-mining has been adopted as a critical priority area, considering the dependence of about 
85 percent of the population on subsistence agriculture to sustain their livelihoods. Due to 
the importance of de-mining for socio-economic development, the government aims to 
reduce the number of injuries and deaths caused by landmines, and to fast-track land mine 
clearance in order to make contaminated land available for productive use. 
4.3.3 Health 
4.3.3.1 Reducing infantlchild mortality 
To address Angola's dire health situation, the Ministry of Health developed among other a 
Strategic Plan for the Accelerated Reduction of Infant and Mother Mortality in Angola 
(2004-2008), a National Strategic Plan for Reproductive Health (2002-2006), and a 
Vaccination Programme (2005-2006). Two critical areas will be addressed by these 
programmes: reducing by 2015, the infant mortality rate to 104 per 1000 births, and the 
maternal mortality rate from 1400 to 350. Strategies include an extensive immunization 
132 Angola: Post-Conflict Challenges, Country Assessment Report, March 2008, p69. 
133 Angolan Government, 2002. Mine Action in Angola: Strategic Plan 2006-20 II, p 14-16. Available at 
http://www.gichd.org/fileadmin/pdf/ma development/nma-stratiNMAS-Angola-2006-20 I 1. pdf. Accessed on I March 2010. 
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campaign targeting pre-natal and neo-natal tetanus, as well as vaccination campaigns to 
control, and ultimately eradicate diseases such as measles, polio and yellow fever. Lack of 
adequate and quality nutrition is one of the major causes of infant mortality. Intensive 
campaigns highlighting the importance of preventing a deficiency of vitamins and iodine 
have been created to address this. 134 Other specific aims include, improving access to 
primary health care; building the capacity of health workers, especially in the paediatric and 
maternity units; and developing and implementing a monitoring system for drug resistant, 
predictable and potentially epidemic diseases. 135 
4.3.3.2 HIV/AIDS 
The prevalence of HIV I AIDS in Angola is not as extensive compared to other African 
countries. 136 However, to control and avoid the spread of the disease, a National Commission 
Against HIV/AIDS and Epidemics was created by law in 2003. A law on HIV/AIDS was 
approved in 2004, and specific regulations relating to HIV/AIDS have also been 
promulgated. In 2005, the National Institute for AIDS was created. National HIV/AIDS 
Strategic Plans were drawn up for the periods 2001 to 2002, and 2003 to 2008 respectively.137 
In addition, other programmes are being implemented, such as strengthening the 
government's information, education and communication strategy; transmission prevention; 
diagnosis support; availability of medication for treatment; and strengthening of the epidemic 
monitoring system. 138 
4.3.3.3 Malaria/tuberculosis (TB) and other diseases 
Malaria is the major cause of death in Angola for both children and adults. The government 
aims to reduce the occurrence of malaria in the country from three million cases to 900 000 
during the medium-term period, and the related high death toll associated with the disease. 
134 Angola: Post-Conflict Challenges, Country Assessment Report, March 2008, p35. 
135 Angola MDG 2005 Report, pI6-l7. 
136 HIV/AIDS prevalence was estimated at 2.4% in 2004. USAID: Angola - HIV/AIDS and Health Profile. Available at 
http://www.usaid.gov!our work/global health/aids/Countrics/africaiangola protile.pdt: Accessed on 10 March 2010. 
137 Angola: Post-Conflict Challenges, Country Assessment Report, March 2008, p56. 
138 See also Angola: Post-Contlict Challenges, Country Assessment Report, 2008, p15. 
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As part of its strategy to achieve this, the government has adopted a Roll Back Malaria 
Campaign that promotes increased access to primary care and the reinforcement of preventive 
actions, diagnosis and treatment of cases. 139 A TB Strategic Plan (2003 -2007) has also been 
developed. 14o Other widespread diseases which the government has to contend with include 
cholera 141, a resurgence of polio in 2005, and Marburg, a new hemorrhagic disease. 142 
4.3.4 Education 
Some of the main challenges identified within the education sector are: enrolment disparities; 
lack of physical infrastructure; lack of teachers and learning materials; and disparities in 
education expenditure among provinces. 143 
Efforts to improve the education sector are being guided by Angola's Education Sector 
Strategy and National Plan of Action. During the interim phase of transition, activities such 
as the reconstruction and rehabilitation of schools and classrooms, providing teaching 
materials, and upgrading of teacher qualification constituted the essential elements of donor 
assistance. 144 
4.3.5 Financial management 
4.3.5.1 The Public Finance Modernisation Programme (PMFP) 
In an attempt to modernise its public finance system (PMFP)145, the government in 2002 
launched a five year programme aimed at improving institutional capacity within the Ministry 
of Finance, to ensure effectiveness of its internal processes, and to accelerate reporting on 
139 Angola MDG 2005 Report, p21. See also Angola: Post-Conflict Challenges, Country Assessment Report, March 2008, 
p36. 
140 Angola MDG 2005 Report, p22. 
141 Between February 2006 to May 2006, an outbreak of cholera killed over one thousand people. Angola: Post-Conflict 
Challenges, Country Assessment Report, March 2008, p55. 
142 Angola MDG 2005 Report, p23. See also Republic of Angola - European Community, 2008, p 19. 
143Ibid. 
144 United Nations Development Programme, Country Programme Action Plan for Angola: 2009 - 2013, p3 
145 The PMFP is an important as it advances good governance and accountability; in particular, the Asset Management 
component will deal with the reform of the Public Procurement System, a key function in assessing transparency in the use 
of public resources. Another outcome of the PMFP will be a better expenditure tracking system for monitoring devolution of 
resources to agreed priorities. See Republic of Angola - European Community, 2008, p17. 
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financial performance. The programme includes three projects: i) streamlining functions and 
enacting new regulatory frameworks; ii) installing a new technological platform for data 
processing and transmission; and iii) training the staff, individually and on procedures. 
Technical committees have been formed within the Ministry of Finance to spearhead and 
monitor progress. Participation in these processes extends to the relevant ministries and to 
institutions such as the Central Bank of Angola (BNA), and the state-owned national oil 
company, Sonangol. 146 
To date one the major achievements of the PMFP has been the implementation of a plan to 
introduce an integrated financial management information system (SIGFE).147 
4.3.5.2 Statistical information 
The National Statistical Institute (INE) has adopted a five-year action plan aimed at 
streamlining the country's statistical system. The five-year plan is receiving support from 
Norway and the World Bank. Projects which were set to start in 2006, include, a population 
census sponsored by UNFP A, an agricultural census sponsored by F AO, and a demographic 
and health survey sponsored by USAID. In February 2004 Angola joined the IMF-sponsored 
General Data Dissemination System (GDDS), a project aimed at improving statistical 
systems. 148 
4.3.6 Governance 
4.3.6.1 Decentralisation 
Decentralisation is another priority area for the Angolan Government. Measures to 
implement decentralisation have included the creation of a Directorate for Municipal Affairs 
in the Ministry of Territorial Administration, and provisions are also outlined in the New 
146 See Republic of Angola- European Community, 2008, p17. Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter!repositOlyiscanned ao csp 10 en.pdf. Accessed on 3 March 20 I O. 
147 United Nations Development Programme, 2005. Economic Report on Angola in 2002-2004: Defusing the Remnants of 
War, p9. 
148 United Nations Development Programme, 2005, p9. 
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Constitution adopted in January 2010. In 2001, the government had also approved a National 
Plan for Decentralisation and Deconcentration. Since then the decentralisation process 
empowering the municipalities for local decision making and service delivery has been 
underway. 149 
More recently, the Decree 2/07 was approved, making provision for selected municipalities to 
become increasingly responsible for their budgets. Decree 2/07 reinforces the status of the 
provincial and municipal governments as deconcentrated units of the State. A Programme for 
Improvement of Municipal Management was created in 2007. It is envisaged that municipal 
administrations will in future become autonomous, holding executive and legislative 
powers. ISO 
4.3.6.2 Public administration 
The rehabilitation of the Angolan state is a key determinant to whether long-term stability 
will be achieved. During the last four decades of war, there has been virtually no investment 
in the development of State administration at the national, provincial or municipal levels. 
Administrative capacity has been described as minimal at best. Given its key role in socio-
economic development, the Angolan government has undertaken to promote an efficient, 
transparent, accountable, and professional public administration system. The need to rebuild 
effective State administration is essential for several reasons, including the expectation that 
the government should become more involved in the delivery of basic services, and that poor 
governance and weak administrative capacity makes the country an unattractive destination 
for investment, especially outside the natural resources sector. lSI 
4.3.6.3 Transparency 
Angola is perceived to be one of the most poorly governed countries in the world, according 
to indicators compiled by the World Bank Institute. However, the government has yet to 
149 Angola: Post-Conflict Challenges, Country Assessment Report, March 200S, p3S. 
150Ibid. 
151 Ibid. 
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develop a clear strategy to tackle issues of governance. Transparency and accountability in 
the management of public resources remain low. Neither the Ministry of Finance nor the 
Central Bank is able to perform their oversight roles, especially because some public 
resources are channelled through the office of the President and are not subject to their 
. d k . 152 scrutmy or recor eepmg. 
Despite these difficulties, some progress has been made in the following areas: auditing oil 
companies - cost and fiscal audits of all oil companies, including Sonangol, are conducted by 
internationally qualified auditors; and management of oil revenues - the government has 
created a separate account at the Central Bank to deposit some oil revenues as precautionary 
savmgs. In April 2006, the government signed a contract with Aberdeen University 
Petroleum Economic Consultancy (AUPEC) to implement an oil revenue forecasting model, 
as recommended by IDA. Other measures to improve governance and transparency have 
included: publishing oil company payments; posting data on oil company payments on the 
website of the Ministry of Finance; and oil tax administration - the government updated and 
simplified rules governing oil taxation in 2004. 153 
4.3.7 Economy 
4.3.7.1 Macro-economic stability 
Angola is on a sustained path to economic reform. In 2003, it adopted a Stabilisation 
Programme, which contributed to lowering the inflation rate. The country faces three main 
macro-economic challenges: i) managing its oil wealth before oil production begins to 
decline to ensure long-term fiscal and debt sustainability; ii) improving its economIC 
competitiveness; and iii) developing its non-oillnon-extractive economy. It will have to 
152 Ibid. 
153 Angola: Post-Conflict Challenges, Country Assessment Report, March 2008. 
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diversify its economy and develop a more vibrant non-oil private sector, essential for long-
term growth and a sound business environment, if it wishes to maintain high growth rates. 154 
The Angolan government is not dependent on donor funding or financial assistance from 
international financial institutions such as the World Bank and IMF. In March 2007, the 
government decided not to enter into a programme with the IMF, believing that this step was 
unnecessary given the country's current strong macro-economic performance and increasing 
foreign exchange reserves. Many in the government also have a preference for home-grown 
policies, and a gradualist approach to economic development, believing that advice given by 
the IMF and others to African countries in the 1990s was flawed. 155 
As part of its debt management, Angola repaid its principal arrears (US $2.3 billion) to the 
Paris Club creditors in early 2007. 156 
4.4. Role of external actors 
4.4.1 African Development Bank 
Two Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) were prepared for 2002 - 2004, and 2005 - 2007, and 
covered rural and social sectors. The first one emphasised rehabilitation and health 
infrastructure, demobilisation and social integration activities, while the second one was 
designed to tackle poverty reduction in rural areas and create a conducive environment for 
private sector development. Both CSPs were aligned with priority sectors identified in the 
Interim-Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP) which set out a total of ten: i) social 
reintegration; ii) security and human care; iii) food security and rural development; iv) 
154 United Nations Development Programme, Country Programme Action Plan for Angola: 2009 - 2013, pl-2. Available at 
http://mirror.undp.org/angolaiLinkRttiUNDAF-AO-2009-En.pdr. Accessed on 10 February 2010. 
155 Shaxson,N., Neves, J., Pacheco, F. 2008, p42. 
156 World Bank, International Development Association, Interim Strategy Note for Angola, April 26, 2007, p4. Available at 
http://www-
wds. worldbank. orgl external 1 deraul tlWDSColltentServer!W OS P!I B/2007 /05/04/0003 I 0607 20070504092646/RenderediP 0 
F/39394main.pdf. Accessed on 10 August 2009. 
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HIV/AIDS; v) education; vi) health; vii) basic infrastructure; viii) employment and 
vocational training; ix) governance; and x) macro-economic management. IS7 
4.4.2 European Commission 
The European Commission and Angolan Government jointly developed a Country Strategy 
Paper and National Indicative Programme covering the period 2008 to 2013. Financial 
assistance of €228 million was made available by the Commission for implementing the 
activities relating to the programme. The key focus areas of the joint programme are: 
governance and support to economic and institutional reform; human and social 
development; and promoting rural development, agriculture and food security. Through 
these key targeted areas, the Commission hopes to contribute to the sustainable development 
of the country.IS8 
4.4.3 The World Bank 
The Bank's programmes in Angola include an Emergency Multi-sector Recovery Programme 
(EMRP2) which focuses on upgrading infrastructure, supporting rehabilitation or 
construction of feeder roads, trunk roads (including bridges), electricity services, rural water 
supply, and water supply in the provincial capital, and urban infrastructure. The Bank also 
developed a Transitional Support Strategy (TSS) for the period 2003 to 2004 for Angola. 
The TSS focused on economic and sector work in respect of transparency and governance 
. IS9 Issues. 
157 African Development Bank, 2008. Angola: Country Strategy Paper Update. Available at 
http://www.atab.orglti leadmin/uploads/ utab/Documents/Project -and-Operations/AD 8-8 D- [F -2008-\59-EN -AN GO LA-
CSP-UPDATE-VERSION-FX.PDF. Accessed on 10 August 2009. 
158 The EU's assistance is guided by its framework known as "Link between Relief, Rehabilitation and Development 
(LRRD). The strategy proposes short-, medium-, and long-term interventions to contribute to the following objectives: 
furtherance of the 2002 peace process, national reconciliation and the consolidation of democracy including the creation of 
conditions for free and fair elections; good governance and development of civil society; poverty alleviation through a 
gradual concentration of EU's aid on food security and social sectors. Republic of Angola - European Community, 2008, 
p4-5. 
159 Angola: Post-Conflict Challenges, Country Assessment Report, March 2008, p91. 
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4.4.4 United Nations 
The UNDAF (2009 - 2013) is built around the following six of the Government's national 
priorities, as outlined in its draft National Medium-Tenn (2009-2013) Development Plan: 
• Promote the unity, national cohesion and consolidation of democracy and national 
institutions; 
• Guarantee a sound and sustainable economIC development, with macro-economIC 
stability, transfonnation and diversification of economic structures; 
• Promote human development and social well being; 
• Stimulate the private sector development and support national entrepreneurship; 
• Promote an equitable development of the national territory; and 
• Strengthen the national competitive insertion in the international trade context. 160 
The UN support strategy during this phase will be concentrated on: i) improving the living 
conditions of Angolans by eradicating hunger, poverty and promoting adequate levels of 
education and sanitation; ii) promoting national cohesion and the consolidation of 
democracy; and iii) ensuring sustainable economic development, freedom and fundamental 
rights. 161 
4.4.5 Bilateral donors 
The US, Norway, Portugal and Japan are the biggest bilateral funders of development 
programmes in Angola. Japan has been providing assistance in various areas including food, 
food production, repatriation and reintegration of refugees, and rehabilitation of basic 
infrastructure, as part of its efforts to ensure that the people of Angola receive peace 
160 United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), Angola: 2009 - 2013, pS. 
161 United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), Angola: 2009 - 2013, pS. 
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dividends. In 2005, the government of Japan, along with the UN, extended assistance 
totalling more than US$l million to support primary education, school feeding programmes, 
and raising HIV/ AIDS awareness. Portugal focuses its support in the areas of education and 
technical support, while the US has focussed on rural development. 162 
4.5. Conclusion 
The Angolan government has developed its own home-grown post-conflict reconstruction 
and development strategies. This is an important step as solutions to the vast challenges the 
country face cannot be imposed by external actors. With research showing that it could cost 
between US$1.5 billion and US$15 billion per year to fund post-conflict recovery activities, 
and considering that the average post-conflict period is at the minimum five years long, the 
need for international assistance and co-operation is clear. 163 Angola should not have to carry 
the burden of its post-conflict recovery process alone, even if it has the financial means to 
implement most of its recovery programmes. 
162 Magalhaes Ferreria, P. 2009, p25. 
163 Gueli, R. 2007. South Africa: new strategies for helping to mend the African fabric. Business Day, 3 September 2007, 
Johannesburg. 
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Chapter 5. Rebuilding Angola 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter assesses the implementation of Angola's post-conflict reconstruction and 
development programmes. The progress that has been made, as well as the challenges of 
implementation will be highlighted and the prospects for success considered. Noting that 
Angola's post-conflict challenges are interrelated, and due to the scope of the challenges 
presented in Angola's post-conflict environment, this section of the study will only examine 
some of the key challenges and priority areas identified by the Angolan government. 164 
5.2. Progress, challenges and prospects 
Post-conflict reconstruction is a long-term process. In the first seven years of its post-conflict 
period, Angola was able to implement a comprehensive DDR process, as well as make some 
headway with de-mining. Some of its most notable progress has been made in infrastructure 
development and education. The Angolan government was also able to sustain economic 
growth and stabilise the country's macro-economy. Transparency in governance, especially 
relating to financial management, and socio-economic development are some of the areas that 
have proved to be more complex and challenging. These will be considered in more detail 
below. 
164 Angola's PRSP, one of the base documents for its reconstruction process, identifies ten priority areas of intervention: i) 
social integration; ii) security and civil protection; iii) food security and rural development; iv) HIV/AIDS; v) education; vi) 
health; vii) basic infrastructure; viii) employment and vocational training; ix) good governance; and x) macro-economic 
management. See Republic of Angola - European Community, 2008, p24. 
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5.2.1 Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR/65 
The Angolan government has implemented a comprehensive DDR programme since 2002. 
Guided by the Angolan Demobilisation and Integration Programme (ADRP)166, and using 
mainly its own resources for the disarmament and demobilisation of UNIT A troops, the 
government was able to reintegrate an estimated 450 000 people in their areas of origin. The 
challenges of implementing a DDR programme in addition to the challenge of returning and 
reintegrating almost four million displaced persons was a monumental task. The limited or 
lack of access to large parts of the country due to landmines, as well as thousands of people 
in temporary resettlement sites, added to the challenge of managing the DDR process. 167 
The government's 2001 Norms on Resettlement and Return defined a number of pre-
conditions necessary for resettlementl68, but as a result of the magnitude of people returning, 
the return and resettlement of the displaced frequently took place despite the lack of suitable 
conditions prescribed. 
The government, in June 2002, established the National Commission for Social and 
Productive Reintegration of the Demobilised and Displaced (CNRSPDD) to plan and manage 
the DDR process. The co-ordination and implementation of the process, was however, the 
task of the Joint Military Commission and a Technical Committee. 169 A three year 
programme, Programme for the Socio-Economic and Professional Reintegration of Ex-
UNIT A Combatants, makes provision for training, education, creating small income 
generating activities, rehabilitation of roads, social infrastructure, and energy sources, and the 
creation of jobs in the public and private sectors, as well as support for the resettlement and 
community development of the rural population. 17o By February 2003, emergency 
165 Demobilisation and reintegration consists of four phases: the assembly of quartering troops; the demobilisation and 
discharge of troops; the initial reinsertion of ex-combatants into civilian life; and long-tenn re-integration, OCHA's role in 
co-ordinating demobilisation and reintegration efforts. Available at 
http://reliefweb.int/OCHA OLlpub!angola/summary.html. Accessed on 16 February 2010. 
166 The ADRP is partly funded by donors. Republic of Angola - European Community, 2008, p 14. 
167 Gomes Porto, 1., Parsons, I., Alden, C. 2007. From Soldiers to Citizens, The Social, Economic and Political 
Reintegration of UNIT A ex-combatants, ISS Monograph Series, No 130, March 2007, pix-xi. 
168 The five provinces most affected were Luanda, Benguela, Lunda Norte, Huambo, and Kwanza Sui, receiving a combined 
total of2.5 million displaced people. Gomes Porto, 1., Parsons, I., Alden, I. 2007, pxv. 
169 Gomes Porto, J., Parsons, I., Alden, C. 2007, pxiv. 
170 Angola: Post-Conflict Challenges, Country Assessment Report, March 2008, p47. 
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reinsertion support l71 had been given to a total of 71 434 fonner combatants. Records from 
February 2004, indicate the registration of approximately 98 252 post-Luena ex-combatants 
at the Ministry of Assistance and Social Reinsertion (MINARS). A Programme for the 
Operationalisation of a Social Reinsertion Support Strategy prepared by MINARS provided 
for the distribution of resettlement kits, and an emergency reinsertion subsidy. Food 
assistance, the provision of clothing and domestic utensils, kits, agricultural inputs, and 
addressing other emergency needs were also part of the programme. In 
The disannament and demobilisation process is considered to have been relatively successful. 
This is especially significant as the process took place in the absence of, and without the 
assistance of an international peacekeeping force. No provision for fonnal third party 
monitoring was included in the Luena Agreement, although the Troika (Portugal, Russia and 
the United States), as well as the United Nations were invited as observers.173 The 
reintegration process is still hampered by some difficulties. However, ongoing efforts are 
made to assist in the areas where such challenges are being reported. 
The government has also turned its attention to combating the problem of small anns and 
light weapons, which poses a major security threat for Angola. In 2003, an estimated three to 
four million small anns and light weapons remained in the hands of civilians throughout the 
country. In March 2003, the government established a National Commission for the 
Disannament of the Civilian Population, under the Public Order branch of the National 
Command of Police. Since then a national strategy for weapons collection has been designed 
as well as a programme of action to deal with the illicit trade in small anns and light 
weapons. 174 
171 Equivalent to five months salary. Gomes Porto, 1., Parsons, I., Alden, C. 2007, pxv. 
172 Gomes Porto, 1., Parsons, I., Alden, C. 2007, pxv. See also Angola: Post-Conflict Challenges, Country Assessment 
Report, March 2008, p47. 
173 Gomes Porto, 1., Parsons, I., Alden, C 2007, March 2007, pxiii. 
174 Angola: Post-Conflict Challenges, Country Assessment Report, March 2008, p48. 
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5.2.2 De-mining 
Considered one of the most mined countries in Africa and globally, Angola has 
approximately six to eight million mines spread across the country. The Angolan 
government has since 2002 provided about US$ 3 million annually for de-mining operations. 
The funds are managed by the National Demining Institute (INAD) and the Intersectoral 
Commission for Demining and Humanitarian Assistance (CNIDAH). Since 2006, the 
government has also committed additional funds to resource, equip and train manual and 
mechanical de-mining brigades in the Angolan Armed Forces and INAD. 175 The CNIDAH 
reported in 2003, that land totalling 3 525 197m2 had been cleared, 14 762 anti-personnel 
mines (APMs), 1 045 anti-vehicle mines, and 71 596 unexploded ordinances (UXOs) were 
destroyed. 176 
Mine action is one area in which cooperation between the Angolan government and foreign 
partners has yielded encouraging results. Seven international NGOs: HALO Trust, 
Norwegian People's Aid, DanchurchAid, INTERSOS, Mines Advisory Group, Menschen 
gegen Minen (People Against Landmines), and Santa Barbara Foundation, are involved in 
. 1 177 mme c earance. In 2003, local and international NGOs provided mine education to 
806 319 individuals through 8077 events. In addition to foreign support, the government 
announced its decision to earmark US$16 million annually in the budget for mine action, for 
activities to be implemented by its own de-mining brigades. 178 
The National Institute for Professional Training of the Ministry of Labour, and the National 
Institute for Support of Disabled People of the Ministry of Social Affairs, work with national 
and international NGOs, to support mine-survivors with vocational training and micro-credit 
175 Angolan Government, 2002. Mine Action in Angola: Strategic Plan 2006-2011, pI4-16. Available at 
http://www.gichd.org/tileadmin/pdf/ma development/nma-stratiNMAS-Angola-2006-20 II.pdf Accessed on 1 March 2010. 
176 Angola: Post-Conflict Challenges, Country Assessment Report, March 2008, p50. See also Angola: On trail- a faster 
more reliable way to clear mined roads. Refworld, 2009. Available at http://www.unhcr.org/rcfworld/country. Accessed on 
6 March 2010. 
177 Angola: Post-Conflict Challenges, Country Assessment Report, March 2008, p50. 
178 United Nations Development Programme, 2005. Economic Report on Angola in 2002-2004: Defusing the Remnants of 
War, p54. See also Angola: Post-Conflict Challenges, Country Assessment Report, March 2008, p5I. 
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programmes. Seventeen countries have contributed to mine-action programmes in Angola, 
totalling USS21.9 million. 179 
5.2.3 Infrastructure development 
The Angolan government has concentrated most of its post-conflict reconstruction spending 
on the rehabilitation, rebuilding and development of physical infrastructure, especially its 
transport and energy sectors. 
5.2.3.1 Transport 
A priority for the Angolan government was developing improved and safe transport 
networks. Here, the government has focused on the rehabilitation of rural roads and bridges 
destroyed in the war and those decayed from the lack of maintenance. The Angolan 
government has estimated that it will cost approximately US$4 billion to repair part of the 
disused and damaged rail networks and to rebuild the rest. According to the Ministry of 
Transport feasibility study, it will take 11 years to get the network fully operational. The first 
phase, after which some major train networks will be able to function, will cost an estimated 
US$300 million. 18o 
The project ANGO FERRO 2000 is valued at US$4.158 billion for the rehabilitation and 
construction of about 3,100 kms of roads, 8 000 km long, 36 bridges, rehabilitation and 
construction of 29 stations and posts (CFB), 70 new stations and 150 new way-side stations. 
Also planned is an increase in connection points of the railway with 16 national and six 
179 Angola: Post-Conflict Challenges, Country Assessment Report, March 2008, p52. 
180 United Nations Development Programme, 2005. Economic Report on Angola in 2002-2004: Defusing the Remnants of 
War, p63. See also AIDB/OECD 2008. African Economic Outlook, Available at: 
http://www.afdb.org/fileadminiuploads/afdb/Documents/Publiclltions/30727878-EN-ANGOLA-AE02008.PDF. Accessed 
on 10 March 2010. 
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international road traffic connections. The Angolan integrated railway network will provide 
port infrastructure for SADC member countries that do not have access to the sea. 181 
In 2004, the government began work on several vital bridges, including: the bridge over the 
Kwanza River that links south of Luanda to the south and the centre of the country; the 
bridge over the Cavaco River linking Lobito and Benguela; the bridge over the Zenza River 
in Kuanza Norte province linking the Ngonguembo Municipality to the provincial capital 
Ndalatando, and the bridge over the Lui River which links Malange to Luena. 182 
Chinese investment has played an important role in infrastructure development. Financial 
support pledged by China for the reconstruction of Angola stands at nearly US$7 billion. 
China's aid consists of two credit lines of US$2 billion from China's Eximbank and an 
additional US$2 billion from China International Fund. The latter credit line has gone to 
projects relating to the Luanda International Airport, the Carninhos de Ferro de Luanda 
railway project, drainage systems in the capital, studies on the new city to be built close to 
Luanda, and improvements to the Luanda-Lobito, Malanje-Saurimo, Saurimo-Dondo, and 
Saurimo-Luena highways. More recent estimates of China's loans to Angola indicate 
amounts of between US$13.4 billion and US$19.6 billion. 183 
5.2.3.2 Construction sector 
Due to an increase in infrastructure development and residential housing projects, the 
construction sector continues to expand, especially in Luanda and Benguela. New projects 
include the construction of a new town in the Benguela Baia Azul municipality, the Benguela 
Blue Ocean project. Several oil companies are building skyscraper office buildings, several 
major residential projects are in the pipeline, and 39 hotels are to be built over the next five 
181 United Nations Development Programme, 2005. Economic Report on Angola in 2002-2004: Defusing the Remnants of 
War, p26. 
182 United Nations Development Programme, 2005. Economic Report on Angola in 2002-2004: Defusing the Remnants of 
War, p63. 
183 Vines, A., Wong, L., Weimer, M., Campos, I. 2009. Thirst for African Oil: Asian National Oil Companies in Nigeria and 
Angola. Chatham House, London, p3. Available at http://www.chathamhouse.org.ukifilesIl4524 1'0809 africanoil.pdf. 
Accessed on 6 February 20 I O. 
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years. For the African Nations Cup held in January 2010, new international football stadiums 
were also built. 184 
The government plans to spend US$50 billion on providing new homes for Angolans by 
2012. A government housing project estimated at us $100 million will provide 2 448 
housing units (flats and houses) to civil servants, with repayment for the houses guaranteed 
through salary deductions. 18s The lack of adequate housing remains, however, a huge 
challenge in both the urban and rural areas. 
5.2.3.3 Power/energy sector 
Electricity 
The total amount of power projects being built across Angola until 2012 is estimated at more 
than US$2.5 billion. Only about 20 percent of the Angolan population has access to 
electricity. Electricity supply to urban areas is the government's immediate focus, and the 
rehabilitation of power systems has resulted in improvements within many urban areas. 186 
Producing such highly visible results in the area of electricity provision forms part of the 
government's strategy of creating confidence in its rebuilding efforts amongst the population. 
Improvements include the following: 
• The cities of Luanda and Malanje benefited from the Capanda hydroelectric dam in the 
northern province of Malanje after it was completed in 2004; 
• Towns in the Benguela province have had their electricity restored. A public lighting 
project is underway in Benguela to light four municipalities; 
184 African Economic Outlook, 2008. Angola. AfDB/OECD 2008, p126. See also United Nations Development 
Programme,2005. Economic Report on Angola in 2002-2004: Defusing the Remnants of War, p18. 
185 United Nations Development Programme, 2005. Economic Report on Angola in 2002-2004: Defusing the Remnants of 
War, p26. 
186 Vines, A., Wong, L., Weimer, M., Campos, 1., 2009. Thirst for African Oil: Asian National Oil Companies in Nigeria 
and Angola. Chatham House, London, p3. Available at http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/filesI14524 r0809 atncanoi1.pdf. 
Accessed on 6 February 20 I O. In Luanda electricity access has already reached new 60 000 households. 
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• Sourimo, the capital of Luanda SuI Province, improved its electricity supply; and 
• The districts of Muconda and Dala, and Cocolo villages restored their lights, and many 
other villages are in the process of getting their lights restored. 187 
Chinese investment, VIa a credit line of US$5 billion, has also propelled the growth of 
electricity generation with expected growth set at 42 percent for the 2007 to 2008 period. 
Future developments include: 
• The Apanda-N'dalantando powerline; 
• A new power line from the Cambambe Dam to Luanda; 
• A series of electricity distribution and transformation centres; 
• A power line from Quifangondo to Caxito; and 
• A 70 million project to electrify Luanda's urban areas. 188 
Biofuels 
Angola could become one of the most important producers of biofuels in Africa. The 
country's national oil company, Sonangol, a Brazilian company, Odebrecht, and the Angolan 
firm, Darner, recently signed an agreement to set up a new biofuel company, Biocom. The 
deal involves a US$200 million investment in a 30 000 hectare sugarcane plantation, which 
will produce enough fuel annually to fire a 140 MW power plant. This biofuel project will be 
located in one ofthe three industrial clusters created by the government. 189 
187 United Nations Development Programme, 2005. Economic Report on Angola in 2002-2004: Defusing the Remnants of 
War, p62. 
188 United Nations Development Programme, 2005, p63. 
189 African Economic Outlook, 2008. Angola. AIDB/OECD 2008, p 125. These three clusters are Futila (in Cabinda), Viana 
(Luanda) and Catumbela (Benguela). The Viana cluster is the biggest and the most advanced, with 119 contracts signed in a 
number of agricultural and industrial sectors. 
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5.2.4 Agriculture 
The Rural Extension Programme and the Rural Development Programme (PEDR) were 
approved by the Counsel of Ministers on 12 June 2005. A budget of US$205 million has 
been set aside to implement the PEDR programmes across seven provinces over a five-year 
period. Some of the programme components include: seed distribution, staff training, and 
equipment for 111 Agricultural Development Stations (EDAs). The PEDR is intended as a 
framework for all agricultural interventions in rural areas and works through intense and 
formal cooperation with all potential partners in the field. With the return of displaced people 
and the rehabilitation of rural infrastructure, which was almost completely destroyed by the 
war, the agricultural sector is gradually recovering. 
Agriculture is a priority sector for public investment, particularly in irrigation, owing to its 
importance in employment creation and poverty reduction. An agreement was signed in late 
2007 between Angola and the International Fund for Agricultural Development to provide a 
credit line of US $45 million to 200 000 farmers to strengthen agricultural production and 
investment. 190 
Two-thirds of the population depend on agriculture for food, income and employment. 
Women provide most of the agricultural labour force. State budget allocations for the 
agricultural sector are low, despite the fact that agriculture has been identified as a priority 
sector of the poverty reduction strategy. 191 The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development (MINADER) bears government's responsibility for promoting the development 
of crops, livestock, and forestry.l92 
There is not yet a clear rural development policy framework and the government is in the 
process of re-examining and clarifying its goals in the agricultural sector via an Action Plan 
for the Agriculture Sector (2001-2010) and an Action Plan for the Agricultural Development 
190 Republic of Angola - European Community, 2008. Annex 12: Analysis of Past and Present Cooperation of the European 
Commission in the Field of Rural Development and Food Security in Angola, p46. 
191 International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), 2005. Republic of Angola: Country Strategic Opportunities 
Paper, p3. Available at htU)://www.ifad.org/gbdocs/eb/85/e/EB-2005-85-R-12.pdt Accessed on I March 2010. 
192 International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), 2005, p4. 
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Institute (IDA) for the period 2002 to 2005. Aims related to improving the sector include: i) 
increasing food security; ii)reducing rural poverty; iii)raising crop production; iv) promoting 
livestock production; v) developing the forestry sector; vi) reactivating rural trade; vii) 
modernising the animal health research system; viii) rehabilitating irrigation systems; ix) 
rehabilitating rural infrastructure; and x) supporting human resource training and skills. 193 
5.2.5 Trading/SADe 
Although Angola is a member of SADC and the Economic Community of Central African 
States (ECCAS), its major trading partners are outside Africa. Portugal continues to be the 
largest source of imports and an important destination for exports. Trade with Brazil has also 
increased dramatically, with imports rising four-fold between 2003 and 2006. Angola has 
become the fourth-largest African export market for Brazil. Imports from South Africa 
increased by 37 percent from mid-2006 to mid-2007. In November 2007, Angola and South 
Africa signed two cooperation agreements in the oil and tourism sectors, as well as a 
declaration of intention on eliminating visa requirements. 
In 2002 and 2003 Angola participated in several meetings of the Southern African Power 
Pool (SAPP), the cooperative created to promote a power pool through the expansion of 
interconnections between member states. 194 An example of regional cooperation is the 
country's involvement in the Lobito Corridor Development Project. The project will enable 
the Capanda 520 MW hydroelectric power station to be better utilized, as it will supply power 
not only to the national grid but also to the regional network. The project will also make it 
possible for the country to be interconnected to the regional network and for ENE to become 
an operative member of the SAPp. 195 The Angolan government sees SADC as the market 
193 International Fund for Agricultural Development (IF AD), 2005, p4. 
194 SADC has adopted its Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) to be implemented within 15 years, for 
building effective and efficient infrastructure that will serve as a support suitable for the supply of cheap energy, 
development of tourism, transportation, communication, and meteorology and integrated management of water resources. 
Angola can link its own national plans to RISDPs plans. United Nations Development Programme, 2005. Economic Report 
on Angola in 2002-2004: Defusing the Remnants of War, p27. 
195 The western corridor project involves the electric power companies of Angola, Namibia, South Africa, Botswana and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo. The main undertakings will be: construction of a 3500 MW hydropower station at rnga, 
Congo; construction of a transmission line interconnecting the five countries; and a telecommunications component using 
optical fibre ground wires to facilitate operation and improve the reliability of power systems. United Nations Development 
Programme, 2005. Economic Report on Angola in 2002-2004, Defusing the Remnants of War, p27. 
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-that it never had, and aims to position itself advantageously within the region to exploit this 
potential. It sees SADC as an entry point to diversify Angola's oil-based economy, as 
SADC's demand is high for certain products, such as petrochemicals. 196 
5.2.6 Economic management 
The Angolan government has implemented major economic reforms since 2002 to increase 
transparency. These include: i) the unification of the budget; ii) the establishment of a single 
treasury account at the National Bank of Angola (BNA); iii) the publication of an oil 
diagnostic study; iv) the release of oil revenue data on the website of the Ministry of Finance; 
v) the conduct of external audits of the 2003 financial statements of the BNA and Sonangol; 
and vi) the compilation of comprehensive data on external debt. 197 
Customs reform introduced by the government in March 2001 resulted in a rise in customs 
receipts from US$215 million in 2000 to US$1 billion in 2005. 198 
5.2. 7 Other initiatives 
Several government initiatives have taken off, including the 2007 Programme of 
Restructuring the Logistics and Distribution of Essential Products to the Population 
(PRESILD). The programme consists of the construction of 10 000 retail sales outlets, 163 
municipal markets, 31 "Nosso Super" supermarkets, and eight distribution centres. This 
initiative is expected to reduce food prices, enlarge the market for locally produced food 
products, and help to create 200 000 jobs by 2012. 199 
An important feature of the budget legislation for 2008 is the pilot decentralisation of budget 
execution. Sixty-eight of Angola's 167 municipalities have been designated as "fiscal units", 
and each will be allocated US$300 000, which will subsequently be scaled up to US$1 
196 See Republic of Angola- European Community, 2008, p24. 
197 See Republic of Angola- European Community, 2008, p18. 
198 Ibid .. 
199 African Economic Outlook, 2008. Angola. AIDB/OECD 2008, p127. 
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million. This reform, which reduces the dependence of local administration on provincial 
governments, aims to raise the execution rate of capital projects and to accelerate and 
improve delivery of basic services. 
Angola held its first General Assembly of the Human Rights Coordination Council (HRCC) 
in February 2007. The meeting was attended by representatives of the National Assembly, 
the Ombudsman and the Ministry of Justice. 
5.3. Conclusion 
Angola has achieved remarkable progress in some areas such as DDR and de-mining, and is 
making progress in infrastructure development. The challenges remain mostly in the areas of 
socio-economic development and governance, especially with regard to transparency and the 
use of the country's oil wealth and public resources. However, the government and its people 
have proved to be resilient and determined to overcome the remaining obstacles to the 
country's development. 
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Chapter 6. Findings and conclusion 
6.1. Introduction 
Since the signing of the Luena Peace Agreement on 4 April 2002, the Angolan people have 
experienced a sustained peace, and most analysts agree that a return to civil war in Angola is 
unlikely. The country has achieved several peace milestones over the short-term 
(emergency) post-conflict phase. However, there are still huge challenges ahead as the 
country enters its post-conflict medium- and long-term transition and development phases. 
6.2. Findings 
The Angolan government has been able to develop its own home-grown post-conflict 
reconstruction strategies. These strategies include plans that cover the government's short-, 
medium- and long term goals for the reconstruction of the country. The country's Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper is of particular significance as it is this strategy that has been used 
and implemented by the government since 2004 - this despite the PRSP not receiving 
approval from the IMF or any endorsement by international donors. The government has 
also, in partnership with UN agencies such as the UNDP, embarked on projects that relate 
specifically toward the attainment of the MDG targets by 2015. However, it is unlikely that 
the Angola will meet most ofthese targets by 2015, with the exception possibly ofMDG goal 
two, which relates to universal primary education. 
Some of the short-term emergency goals that have been achieved include a successful 
programme in demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration and refugee repatriation; the 
resettlement of more than four million internally displaced persons; and reintegrating into 
Angolan society more than half a million refugees and over 100 000 ex-combatants. The 
country has also achieved its goal of macro-economic stabilisation, and since 2002, Angola is 
the fastest growing economy in Africa. Another strategic priority for the Angolan 
government has been to improve basic social services to people throughout the country. 
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Although much has been done to start the process, not much progress has been made with 
basic service delivery, and the slow movement towards any significant achievement with 
improvements in this area is a key criticism that has been levelled against the government. 
During the short-term post-conflict phase, the Angolan government has been carrying the 
major burden and cost of financing its post-conflict reconstruction programmes. It has, with 
oil-backed loans from China, been able to sustain some momentum with implementing 
reconstruction programmes, especially in infrastructure development. Major investments in 
infrastructure development are still needed, but in the long term such investments will have 
significant benefits. For example, improvements in Angola's roads, bridges, railways and 
ports will playa key role in enhancing its regional trade and growth. Better infrastructure 
will also encourage increased investment in different sectors of the Angolan economy. 
Angola's medium-term goals pnontlse measures to address the country's human 
development needs. Although Angola is ranked 59th amongst the world's economies, it has 
one of world's lowest ranking human development indicators. The Angolan government's 
ambitious intention is to improve this ranking by 30 points, moving Angola onto the level of 
medium development countries by 2025. With the country's oil and diamond wealth 
however, and if it is applied effectively to benefit the majority of the population, it would be 
possible for the country to achieve a higher HDI ranking. 
A focus on promoting governance and rule of law is also included in the government's 
medium term plans. Progress in these areas is also slow. In its programme for 2009, the 
Angolan government has highlighted its intention to recruit as well as train clerks, bailiffs, 
judges and magistrates amongst others to fill positions in the justice sector. If implemented, 
this would provide an important indicator by which progress in the area of justice can be 
monitored. 
In the area of governance, profound reforms will be required in order to change the 
perception of Angola as one of the world's most corrupt governments. Efforts have been 
made to improve transparency, and decentralisation, and de-concentration programmes are 
being implemented. Importantly, the government held its second legislative elections in 
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September 2008. A new constitution was adopted in January 2010, and Presidential elections 
will take place in 2012. 
Post-conflict reconstruction is a long-term process. The devastation caused by over 40 years 
of armed conflict cannot unfortunately be wiped out in eight or 10 years. The country's long-
term plan, also known as Vision 2025, will be implemented over the next two decades, and 
includes large-scale reforms and specific sector reforms for which targets and indicators have 
been set. 
Thus far, the Angolan government has succeeded in making some progress with its post-
conflict reconstruction, despite the obstacles associated with the enormous task of rebuilding 
a war-ravaged country. 
Some of the important challenges that remain include strengthening weak state and public 
institutions, improving the functioning of the state, and achieving broad reconciliation and 
social integration among Angolans. Although the government has received assistance from 
multilateral organisations such as the UN and the World Bank, as well as from bilateral 
donors, the government's overall relationship with donors and other Western partners in the 
area of post-conflict reconstruction remains weak. Given that almost US$5 billion is required 
annually in order to sustain the momentum of its reconstruction programmes, building this 
relationship will be vital. 
Angola's human capital is the most important resource to ensure a prosperous future for the 
country. The government's development strategies should therefore ensure that it has an 
impact on the youth, currently making up 50 percent of the country's population, so that they 
can become the driving force of national development. 
Thus far the Angolan government's post-conflict reconstruction programmes have produced 
some peace dividends for the Angolan people. However, the country still has a long way to 
go in order to achieve all its goals and objectives. The long-term process of implementing 
recovery programmes is underway, and perhaps only in 2025, a clearer picture will emerge as 
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to whether its strategies and development processes have been successful or whether it has 
failed to yield further peace dividends. 
6.3. Conclusion 
In its Peace Plan, announced on 13 March 2002, following the signing of the Luena Peace 
Agreement, the Angolan government appealed to the country as follows: 
"The government urges all Angolans to unite, so that we may together 
turn an important page in our history. This is a time for reconciliation, 
mutual forgiveness and unity. Let us bid a final farewell to arms and 
war and dedicate ourselves fraternally to the reconstruction of a 
prosperous and modern Angola, capable of guaranteeing the physical, 
material and spiritual well-being of all its citizens and of occupying its 
rightful place in the concert of nations. ,,200 
A new history is indeed being written for Angola, this time, we all hope, it will be a less 
tragic one. 
Angola has the potential to playa leading role in the region and continent. It has proved with 
its involvement in regional organs such as SADC, ECCAS, and initiatives of the AU, that it 
has the capacity to become a key driving force for regional development and change. With 
several other African countries developing and implementing post-conflict reconstruction 
programmes, positive change in Angola could lead the way for others to deliver significant 
peace dividends to people who have suffered the effects of war, and in so doing, prevent the 
return to conflicts which have for so long prevented Africa from realising its full potential for 
development. 
200 Key texts and agreements, in From Military Peace to Social Justice? The Angolan Peace Process, Accord, Issue 15, 
London, p79. 
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